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U.S. Public Pension Fund Diversity Initiatives:
Practices, Rationales, and Constitutionality
Angela Cai*
This Article examines the efforts of U.S. pension funds to promote
racial and gender diversity. Some pensions not only promote corpo-
rate board diversity through direct and indirect lobbying and proxy
voting efforts, but also favor asset managers that are owned or oper-
ated by women and minorities.
This paper is the first to explore these latter programs. I first ex-
amine the practice in the context of pensions' diversity-promotion
agenda as a whole. Next, I explore three likely rationales for why
pensions have taken up diversity promotion as a goal, proposing
three potential rationales: business, equality, and politics.
Without taking a position on whether the ultimate social implica-
tions of these diversity efforts are positive or negative, I argue that the
practice of favoring women and minority asset managers is unlikely
to withstand constitutional review. After charting the nuances of how
lower courts have applied government contracting affirmative action
programs after Croson and Adarand, I apply these insights to minor-
ity and women asset manager hiring programs. My analysis, which
focuses on unique aspects of the asset management business, con-
cludes that public pension funds face a steep uphill battle should these
diverse manager-recruiting programs be challenged in court. While it
is not impossible for a fund to summon adequate evidence of past
discrimination and tailor a program to meet the narrow tailoring re-
quirements, the current programs appear to fall short.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing gender and racial diversity in the business world has long
been a concern of U.S. academic, regulatory, and business communi-
ties. While companies are puzzling over whether and how to pursue
diversity as a norm of corporate governance, another set of financial
institutions has taken a different track and taken large strides to pro-
moting diversity: defined-benefit public pension funds in the United
States. Despite coming under heavy fire for a number of problems,
including severe underfundedness, these funds espouse a surprisingly
strong commitment to diversity. For example, some have lobbied cor-
porations and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") for
greater minority and female representation on corporate boards.
Some have created allocations for "emerging managers" that include
- and are sometimes defined exclusively as - investment funds run by
women and ethnic and racial minorities ("diverse managers"). These
funds pursue these goals despite the lack of empirical verification that
diversity in company or fund management causes better performance,
and despite healthy opposition from entities who challenge diversity-
seeking efforts as impermissible racial classification.
The efforts that U.S. public pension funds ("PPFs") take to pro-
mote diversity are understudied. This paper explores these funds'
commitment to diversity as a unique phenomenon in a landscape
where attitudes, rules, and norms about diversity in corporate govern-
ance and financial investments are on shaky ground. In Part II, I de-
scribe the ways in which PPFs have contributed to promoting diversity
in the corporate governance and asset management spaces. In the cor-
porate governance space, PPFs have supported the SEC's proxy dis-
closure rule that requires companies to disclose whether and how they
consider diversity in board selection, and have undertaken direct lob-
bying efforts and supporting third-party initiatives. On the asset man-
agement front, a number of PPFs have - either by legislation or by
investment committee action - performed specialized searches for in-
vestment management firms and brokerage firms owned and operated
by women and minorities.
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Next, I identify three potential rationales that drive public pension
funds to engage with the project of promoting diversity: a business
case, an equality-based case, and a political case. These rationales ap-
ply in different manners depending on what approach the PPFs' diver-
sity initiatives take form: they operate differently for the corporate
governance front and the investment management front. I focus on
the investment management front, which has never before been syn-
thesized and evaluated.
The business rationale case is rooted in a belief that pursuing these
initiatives could pay off for the pension funds. This could occur
through better performance, either by the corporation in which the
pensions are shareholders or by the investment managers who manage
some of the pension's assets. I examine both logical and empirical
evidence for these claims, and find that though there is some evidence
to suggest that a business case for diversity could exist, the findings
are too mixed and the evidence too weak for a profit-maximizing insti-
tution to rely on. However, the fact that pensions - which do seek to
maximize returns, especially in light of underfundedness - neverthe-
less pursue these initiatives suggests that they are interested in either a
long-term payoff strategy or have other motives for pursuing diversity.
One alternative rationale is that the pensions are trying to combat
the effects of inequality qua inequality. I analyze this approach from
the perspectives of pensions, and explore both a remediation-based
logic and an impact-based logic. The former is focused on correcting
the effects of past discrimination. The latter focuses on the fact that
those who manage pension assets look fundamentally different from
the demographics of the beneficiaries.
Finally, I explore a third "rationale," which is that the funds are
responding to political pressures to make visible strides towards
diversity.
Understanding the reasoning for the funds' efforts can help frame a
crucial question: whether these initiatives, in particular the manager
selection programs, are likely to be considered by courts constitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause. In the second half of this
Article, I argue that the latter strategy of manager selection is an ex-
ample of race- and gender-based classification in government
contracting.
After considering these rationales, I argue that though no cases to
date have been filed and no academic analysis is performed on these
grounds, PPF diverse manager initiatives likely trigger constitutional
problems. In Part IV, I analyze the complex landscape of jurispru-
dence on government contracting affirmative action across courts to-
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day, and apply the prevailing standards to PPF programs. First, I
argue that PPF programs are race-conscious state actions, which
means they are subject to strict scrutiny review. Strict scrutiny re-
quires a showing of compelling state interest and narrow tailoring. I
next sketch out some of the roadblocks in establishing a strong evi-
dentiary basis for remedial efforts to combat past discrimination,
which is necessary to satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.
In Part V, I show that these diverse asset manager hiring programs
are unlikely to meet the strict scrutiny test. First, it is very difficult to
be able for government entities to marshal the kind of disparity study
comparisons that government contracting programs currently use to
justify diversity hiring as a compelling state interest. Next, I explore
the ways in which narrow tailoring analysis could stymie the efforts of
programs that theoretically have passed the compelling state interest
test. Ultimately, I conclude that these programs are very unlikely to
survive strict scrutiny under the applicable standards advanced by the
Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. Croson,1 Adarand Construc-
tors v. Pena,2 and their progeny in federal courts of appeal and state
high courts.
II. THE DIVERSITY-PROMOTION EFFORTS OF
U.S. PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS
There is an increasing trend towards enacting diversity initiatives
among PPFs. The efforts can be roughly categorized in two veins: the
first is to support corporate board diversity and the second is to sup-
port diversity in the investment management business. While the first
approach has been long-recognized, the second has not. Within the
PPF manager-search space, there are a numerous requests for propos-
als ("RFPs") for minority managers that demonstrate these pensions
are aware of and in pursuit of diversity goals in their manager selec-
tion processes. The following section first introduces the corporate
diversity angle and subsequently focuses on the methods used by PPFs
to support diversity in investment management.
A. Supporting Corporate Board Diversity
Many PPFs have long supported increased diversity on corporate
boards. Many publicly-traded companies have dire underrepresenta-
tion of women and ethnic minorities in corporate leadership, and
many shareholders - PPFs among them - believe in voting in qualified
1. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989).
2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand I1), 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995).
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underrepresented candidates. However, their efforts to promote di-
versity include more than just voting for women or minority candi-
dates. First, some PPFs and similar entities lobby for and promote
diversity through supportive public statements and through buttress-
ing third-party initiatives. These initiatives include efforts to increase
corporate board diversity and diversity in the investment management
business.
1. Direct Lobbying
In 2010, the SEC issued a new proxy rule that requires public com-
panies to disclose how, if at all, their corporate board of directors se-
lection processes take into account the subject of diversity.3 The SEC
rule requires companies to
[d]escribe ... whether, and if so how, the nominating committee (or
the board) considers diversity in identifying nominees for director.
If the nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with regard
to the consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees,
describe how this policy is implemented, as well as how the nomi-
nating committee (or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its
policy[.] 4
The upshot of this rule is that corporations filing statements with
the SEC would have to include more information than before about
corporate board diversity, though the margin of that additional infor-
mation is slim. Companies are not asked to define diversity,5 nor is
there an explicit specificity requirement with respect to the processes
disclosed. Nevertheless, the rule received some criticism from com-
mentators who remarked that the SEC's rule is unnecessary. 6 An-
other form of criticism was stronger and more targeted, primarily
focus on whether diversity disclosure is not germane to the SEC's reg-
ulatory role and corporations' duties in selecting qualified candidates
3. SEC Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,355 (Feb. 28, 2010) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.14a-101 (2010)).
4. SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2010).
5. Lisa Fairfax has criticized the SEC's failure to define diversity as potentially devastating to
the rule's effect. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old
Story?, 89 N.C.L. REV. 855, 874-75 (2011).
6. See Comment Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman and CEO of Eaton Corpora-
tion, Chair of Corporate Leadership Initiative, Business Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec'y, SEC 6 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-69.pdf
(commenting that diversity disclosure is unnecessary); Comment Letter from Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC 7 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-118.pdf (stating that the diversity disclosure would be
"unhelpful"); Comment Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair of the Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec.,
ABA to SEC, 26 (Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-152
.pdf (noting that many companies already consider diversity).
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for board governance. 7 One comment letter from the Center for
Equal Opportunity, a conservative think tank, took a strong position
against the SEC's diversity disclosure rule, stating, "We strongly op-
pose any consideration of race or ethnicity in selecting individuals for
a position on a corporate board. Such discrimination is wrong. It is
also illegal." 8
But among the slate of comment letters the SEC received, several
were from PPFs and affiliates who were in support of the diversity
disclosure provisions and, thus, supported the rule. Some letters spe-
cifically mentioned support for diversity initiatives. For example, Cal-
ifornia State Teachers Retirement System ("CalSTRS") Chief
Investment Officer ("CIO") Christopher Ailman wrote in a letter to
the SEC that CalSTRS
wholeheartedly believes corporate board diversity is an important
issue. Over the past several years, both our (United States) aca-
demic and business communities have focused greater attention on
the influence of gender, racial and cultural diversity on boards of
directors and organizational contexts generally. The changing
demographics of the United States and the increasing international
exposure of many U.S. companies makes it important that corpo-
rate boards have a wide-range of cultural backgrounds and a
breadth of experiences .... At CalSTRS, we have demonstrated
our commitment to this issue by submitting proposals to companies
asking them to consider diversity as a criterion in their board re-
cruitment process during the most recent proxy season. 9
CalSTRS's strong support statement was backed by an exhibition of
its own initiatives to promote change at the company level. Its peer
fund California Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS")
wrote in support as well, noting that it "supports amending [the rule]
7. Comment Letter from John C. Guerra, Jr., CEO, New America Alliance, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec'y, SEC 1-2 (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/
s71309-31.pdf (arguing that asking for disclosure of diversity in qualifications for board directors
is unwise because diversity is not a qualification).
8. Comment Letter from Roger Clegg, President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Op-
portunity, to SEC (Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-26
.htm ("For a company to engage in racial or ethnic discrimination would violate 42 U.S.C. [§]
1981, which forbids such discrimination in any contractual relationship, which would include the
relationship between a board member and a corporation. If board members are considered
company employees, then it would also violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
[§] 2000e et seq.").
9. Comment Letter from Christopher Ailman, CIO, CaISTRS, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec-
retary, SEC 2-3 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-84
.pdf. But see Comment Letter from Meredith Williams, Executive Director, Colo. Public Em-
ployees Retirement Association, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, Sep. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-75.pdf (focusing entirely on the value of trans-
parency, but did not specifically mention diversity).
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to require disclosure of the additional factors that a nominating com-
mittee should consider in recruitment, such as diversity."' 0 The rule
also received support from the Connecticut State Treasurer, who over-
sees the state pension fund,11 the Council of Institutional Investors (an
association of pension funds), 12 and Aon Consulting, a firm that works
closely with many pension funds on investment strategies and opera-
tions.1 3 Aon's CEO, Kathryn Hayley, wrote, "I believe board diver-
sity to be critically important, and strongly encourage the SEC to
adopt this amendment.' 14
In a more direct lobbying effort, PPFs also directly communicate
dissatisfaction with board composition to the firms themselves. For
example, in a letter in February 2012, CaISTRS expressed dissatisfac-
tion with Facebook's board of director composition, before the com-
pany's IPO was completed. In part, the letter stated:
We are disappointed that the Facebook board will not have any
women members. This is particularly glaring in view of the fact that
Facebook is going public at a time when there is clear evidence that
companies with diverse boards perform far better than the compa-
nies with more homogeneous boards. We also note that the
Facebook COO, Sheryl Sandberg has been very supportive of in-
creasing the diversity on corporate boards, particularly gender di-
versity, and in the senior management of corporations.15
10. Anne Simpson, Senior Portfolio Manager, Global Equity, CaIPERS, to Elizabeth M. Mur-
phy, Sec'y, SEC 3 (Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-146
.pdf. Interestingly the letter came from Anne Simpson, who was a Senior Portfolio Manager at
CalPERS. Id. at 5. While its Chief Investment Officer Joe Dear and Senior Investment Officer
Eric Baggesen were copied, id., it is not clear why CaIPERS chose to have the letter come from
someone who is not an executive at the fund.
11. Comment Letter from Denise L. Nappier, State Treasurer, Connecticut State Treasurer, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, 7 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-13-09/s71309-104.pdf.
12. Comment Letter from Justin Levis, Senior Research Associate, Council of Institutional
Investors, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC 3 (Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-13-09/s71309-33.pdf.
13. Comment Letter from Kathryn J. Hayley, CEO, Aon, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y,
SEC (Sep. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-42.htm.
14. Id.
15. Letter from Anne Sheehan, Director of Corporate Governance, CaISTRS to Mark Zuck-
erberg, Chairman and CEO, Facebook Inc. (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.calstrs.com/
sites/main/files/file-attachments/letter-facebook.pdf. Facebook was not the only highly publi-
cized IPO to face backlash for not having any women on its initial boards. Twitter suffered the
same fate when it was revealed that its seven-person board contained no women, but eventually
appointed one woman before its IPO. See Sarah Frier & Jeff Green, Twitter Names Majorie
Scardino as First Woman to Join Board, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 5, 2013, http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2013-12-05/twitter-names-marjorie-scardino-as-first-woman-to-join-board.html. See
also Lauren Hepler & Shana Lynch, Twitter's not alone - 8 other Silicon Valley IPO companies
have no women on board, SILICON VALLEY Bus. J. (Oct. 8, 2013), available at http://www
.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2013/10/08/why-twitters-problem-is-silicon.html?page=all.
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In the meantime, similar efforts are being adopted on the legislative
and executive level. Besides the SEC's proxy disclosure rule, a num-
ber of other state governments have moved to increase diversity in
corporate boards. For example, New York City comptroller Scott
Stringer appointed a "chief diversity officer," whose goal is to increase
diversity by "[w]orking with the Comptroller's corporate governance
team on supplier, workplace and board diversity initiatives[.] ' 16 The
California state senate unanimously passed a resolution that encour-
ages public-traded companies in California to appoint at least one
woman member for boards with fewer than five seats, and more
women for boards larger than that.17
2. Supporting Third Party Efforts
Statements, such as letters to the SEC, are not the only way that
PPFs have made affirmative public efforts to support diversity in cor-
porate governance. PPFs also have made efforts to promote external
efforts to increase board diversity. For example, in 2008, California
State Controller John Chiang called on CalPERS and CaISTRS to
work on constructively broadening efforts to promote corporate
board diversity. In a statement in 2009, he made the following call to
action:
With proxy access, we have an opportunity to do what is good - and
do it in a way that makes shareowners responsible partners .... It
is not effective or responsible for shareowners to wait for the An-
nual General Meeting and hope they can just vote down candidates
offered up by management .... My question to you is what can we
do to help search firms and nominating committees attract real, di-
verse talent?' 8
As a result, CalPERS and CaISTRS created a joint initiative with
"other investors, companies, search firms, diversity networks, and aca-
16. Comptroller Scott M. Stringer Appoints Carra Wallace Chief Diversity Officer, Press Re-
lease, Office of the New York City Comptroller (Mar. 7, 2014), available at http://comptroller.nyc
.gov/newsroom/comptroller-scott-m-stringer-appoints-carra-wallace-chief-diversity-officer/
#sthash.Ov5Eii4Z.dpuf. See also Dorreen E. Lilienfield, Measures to Increase Gender Diversity
on Corporate Boards, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 7, 2014, http://www.newyorklawjournal
.conm/id=1202636453791/Measures+to+Increase+Gender+Diversity+on+Corporate+Boards%3F
mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL.
17. S. Con. Res. 62, 2013 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/scr62_bill_2013071lintroduced.pdf. For a graphical resolu-
tion, see California Senate Concurrent Resolution 62 Urging More Women on Boards, PUBLIC
POLICY IMPACT, U. CAL. DAVIS (2013), available at http://gsm.ucdavis.edu/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/public-policy-impact.pdf.
18. John Chiang, Opening Remarks, September 2009 Workshop, CALPERS, available at http://
www.CalPERS-governance.org/marketinitiatives/initiatives/board-diversity/sept2009-workshop
(last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
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demics" to create the "Diverse Director Datasource (3)," which is a
repository of board-ready diverse candidates. 19 As of October 2012,
the initiative has "recruited more than 450 candidates ... with several
hundred more in the pipeline."20
B. Manager Selection Efforts
The aforementioned methods of voting for diverse candidates, lob-
bying for corporate diversity initiatives, and supporting third-party ef-
forts have been relatively well-publicized and well-studied. However,
one of the most prominent ways in which PPFs support diversity ef-
forts is through setting aside allocations for "diverse" managers.
There has been little to no attention paid to this approach thus far
outside of trade journals.
1. Overview of Pension Fund Manager Selection Process
Pension fund assets - the pool of state money that pays benefi-
ciaries' pensions - are managed by both internal and external invest-
ment managers. Often, a large portion of the assets are managed by
external managers. These external investment managers, and the
funds they operate, are usually categorized by the type of asset they
manage for the pensions. For example, a pension fund that allocates
20% of its asset to be invested in international equities would typically
hire a number of different international equities investment firms/
funds, and each would manage a sub-portion of that 20% allocation.
The investment management firms compete for these allocations by
submitting detailed applications by completing "requests for
proposal" ("RFPs"). When a pension fund adds an allocation to a
particular asset (for example, by reallocation 2% of plan assets from
international bonds to. international equities), or if they want to switch
out one manager for another within the same asset class allocation,
they issue RFPs. Interested investment managers fill out those RFPs
and subsequent selection processes - including more data submission,
presentations, interviews, and negotiations - will yield the ultimate
manager. Often, the application process is mediated by consulting
firms or other search firms.21




21. See, e.g., Investment Manager Database, FIS GRoup, available at http://www.fisgroup.com/
fis-managers/case-for-fis-managers (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
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PPFs may have general guidelines for types of investment manag-
ers, or allocation-specific guidelines. An allocation-specific example
would be where a search for bond managers requires that the invest-
ment management fund only invest in bonds of a certain duration. A
general guideline example would be that only funds over a certain
size, or assets under management ("AUM"), would be hired. Some of
these guidelines are specifically listed in the RFP, so that investment
managers that do not fit the qualifications are barred from applying or
being considered. Others are uncommunicated internal preferences,
which means that the pension funds would simply reject certain man-
agers' RFPs because of certain failures to meet these preferences. For
example, a pension fund may prefer longer track records for manag-
ers, but not explicitly state this in RFPs. A fund that started two years
ago, therefore, might send in an application REP but would not win
the investment mandate from a pension fund that has always pre-
ferred established investment managers.
2. Selecting for "Emerging Managers" and Diverse Managers"
Instead of selecting purpose on traditional measures such as per-
formance, tenure, fund AUM, leverage ratio, and custom tailoring,
some pensions prefer that some of their assets be managed by "emerg-
ing managers. '22 The term can refer to two types of asset managers.
First, funds owned or primarily run by women or minorities, and sec-
ond, funds with operational characteristics that are not conventionally
desireable - smaller and newer funds.
The concept of emerging managers has been around for over twenty
years. In 1990, Ed Callan (the founder of the eponymous pension
consulting firm) and Marx Cazenave, the first black stockbroker at
E.F. Hutton and a former California governor's office advisor, formed
the Progress Fund, which is an fund-of-funds or incubator platform for
women and minority managers.23 The Progress Fund has pooled over
$100 million in allocations from pensions, including the Maryland
State Retirement System, to be managed by these diverse managers.24
That there are competing definitions of "emerging manager" is im-
portant because it reveals that the underlying impetus for such a cate-
22. Emerging Manager Programs: A Best Practices Overview, NAT'L Ass'N OF INV. COS. 1
(Jun. 2011), available at http://www.naicpe.com/publications/NAIC-EmergingManagerPrograms
.pdf.
23. See Progress Investment Interactive Timeline, PROGRESS INV. MGMT. Co., available at
http://www.progressinvestment.com/flash/timeline.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). California set
up its emerging manager program in 1990.
24. Id.
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gory of investment managers is not straightforward. Thurman White,
the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of the Progress' Fund, now the
Progress Investment Management Company, wrote in a 2008 reflec-
tion that in the 1990s, the term "emerging manager" arose "in the
wake of concerns about legal challenges to affirmative action," and
originally was "a euphemism for 'owned by women or minorities.'1125
White added that today's definition of "emerging manager" is differ-
ent, that it "has become synonymous with 'independently owned' and
all the positives typically associated with employee-owned businesses
- caring, originality, risk-taking, innovation and hard work by people
with a real, long-term stake in their companies. '26
The muddiness of definition persists. While the "industry defini-
tion" refers to funds that manage below $2 billion in AUM, that defi-
nition is far from uniformly-adopted. Some PPFs specifically use the
emerging market allocation to target firms and funds owned by or
managed by minorities, women, and other groups traditionally under-
represented in the U.S. financial management industry. For these
PPFs, diversity, rather than operational characteristics like age and
AUM, is the primary factor.27 Others focus on the age and AUM of
the fund, but see diversity as an "auxiliary benefit" of emerging man-
ager programs.28
Throughout this paper, I will use "diverse manager" to refer to
those programs that specifically target women and minorities, and
"emerging manager" to refer to those with no explicit gender- or race-
based categorizations, while understanding that at times the vocabu-
lary in practice is blurred. The two categories are not mutually over-
lapping in what they offer to investors. The rationales for investing
with smaller AUM managers can be very different from rationales for
investing with managers operated by racial minorities or women. The
positive characteristics attributed to smaller AUM funds - such as
nimbleness in shifting positions, lower correlation in return streams
that diversify the PPFs' overall portfolios, and responsiveness at the
management level - are not necessarily replicated in larger funds that
25. Thurman V. White, Jr., From Diversity to Diversification: The Evolution of the Term
"Emerging Manager", PROGRESS INV. MGMT. CO. 1 (July 2008), available at http://www.progress
investment.com/content/files/TheEvolutionoftheTermEmergingManager-Essay5.pdf.
26. Id.
27. See Randy Diamond, Public pension funds' definition of emerging manager still a work in
progress, PENSIONS & INVS., Mar. 21, 2012, http://www.pionline.com/article/20120321/ONLINE/
120329976/public-pension-funds-definition-of-emerging-manager-still-a-work-in-progress.
28. Investment Office Diversity and Inclusion Resources, CALPERS (Aug. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.CalPERS.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/targeted-programs/diversity-owned-busi-
ness.xml ("[An ancillary benefit of our emerging manager strategies is greater ethnic and gen-
der diversity among CalPERS external fund managers.").
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are owned or managed by minorities and women. Similarly, advan-
tages potentially ascribable to minority-owned funds, such as rectify-
ing past discrimination and access to capital from underdeveloped
resource areas like urban neighborhoods, are not necessarily applica-
ble to funds that simply have low AUMs.2 9
There has been criticism of the blending of the different ap-
proaches. As the emerging manager trend has continued, some argue
that the minorities-based approach is inappropriate for PPFs:
To many, it appeared as if the pension funds' decision makers were
capitulating to pressure from minority voters and/or vocal civil
rights organizations. This initial reaction upset experienced minor-
ity and some non-minority professionals, who had observed that the
number of qualified emerging managers had increased dramatically
across the country. Indeed, many of these professionals had gradu-
ated from top business schools and honed their investment expertise
by working in top-tier private equity firms.30
Despite the criticisms regarding political capitulation, the trend for
allocating to emerging managers has continued. A number of PPFs
have set aside semi-permanent allocations specifically to these emerg-
ing managers, and RFPs have proceeded accordingly to target these
types of managers. These allocations include direct investments in
emerging managers and investments through fund-of-fund platforms
that specifically aggregate emerging managers.
A number of large PPFs have robust programs in place by legisla-
tive decree. Three of the nation's largest PPFs, CalSTRS, CalPERS,
and the New York State Common Fund ("NYSCF") were pioneers in
this field. Two other large PPFs have followed suit: the Illinois Public
Employees Retirement Fund and the Maryland Treasury Department,
which oversees its Public Employees Retirement Fund, both have
Emerging Manager programs. Except for the California programs,
these legislative programs include explicit and specific reference to
ownership/management by minorities and women.31
In addition, many PPFs have adopted Emerging Manager alloca-
tions by way of investment guidelines, even without the prompting of
legislative mandates. Progress Investment Management Company, a
fund-of-funds of emerging managers platform, whose underlying man-
agers include diverse managers, counts among its clientele a number
29. See infra Part III.A. for a discussion of the differences between the rationales for pursuing
these two categories of investments.
30. Emerging Manager Programs: A Best Practices Overview, supra note 22, at 2.
31. See infra Part IV.A. for details about the race-categorical nature of these programs.
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of state plans that do not have legislative mandates.32 The investment
guidelines of states like Connecticut 33 and Texas34 provide good exam-
ples of non-legislated efforts for diverse and emerging managers, re-
spectively. Indeed, one only has to briefly glance at the RFP
aggregation postings in trade publications to see that there are numer-
ous opportunities for emerging manager searches, and some are REPs
inviting only diverse managers. 35
Finally, in addition to hiring diverse investment managers to invest
plan capital, some PPFs also have policies of placing business with
minority and women-owned brokerage firms. For example, the afore-
mentioned Chicago Teachers' Pension Fund has a board-set policy of
having at least 50 percent of their U.S. Equities portfolio in sepa-
rately-managed accounts to be placed with broker/dealer firms owned
by minorities, women, or individuals with disabilities.36 The Connecti-
cut pension's investment policy targets 25% of "securities trading bro-
32. See Thurman White, Jr. & Mona Williams, Manager of Emerging Managers Overview,
PROGRESS INV. MGMT. CO. 14 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.surs.com/pdfs/minutes/
x_inv/03 2012/exl6.pdf (including Minnesota, Connecticut, and Virginia, and city plans like Mil-
waukee). Progress also has a number of corporate pension and endowment clients. Id.
33. Denise L. Napier, Investment Policy Statement for the State of Connecticut Retirement
Plans & Trust Funds, STATE OF CONN. TREASURER'S OFFICE, available at http://www.ott.ct.gov/
pensiondocs/IPStatement.pdf. The policy's Appendix C, Section II outlines diversity principles,
and describes the "Connecticut Horizon Fund" as a program that "provide[s] opportunity for
investment managers who, for multiple reasons, would not typically have full access" to the fund.
Id. at 235. Specifically, it states:
It is the expressed intent of the CRPTF to afford opportunities for emerging, minority
and women-owned and Connecticut-based investment managers to compete for invest-
ment contracts so long as such managers are fully capable of providing investment man-
agement services consistent with investment strategy and fiduciary standards.
Id. The fund also set diverse brokerage firm targets. Id. at 234.
34. Investment Policy, EMPS RET. SYS. OF TEX. (Dec. 5, 2014), available at http://www.ers.state
.tx.us/AboutERS/ERSInvestments/ERSInvestmentPolicy/. The guidelines define emerging
managers as
[A] private professional investment manager with assets under management of not
more than $2 billion. Private financial services include pension fund management, con-
sulting, investment advising, brokerage services, hedge fund management, private eq-
uity fund management, and real estate investment .... ERS must report to its Board
of Trustees the methods and results of its efforts to hire emerging fund managers, in-
cluding data disaggregated by race, ethnicity, gender and fund size.
Id. at 66.
35. See e.g., Search Roundup, 8 EMERGING MANAGER MONTHLY 15 (Oct. 2013); Appendix A-
1.
36. Chicago Teachers' Pension Fund Request for Proposals: Emerging Markets Equity Man-
ager Search, CHI. TEACHERS' PENSION FUND 4 (2012), available at http://www.ctpf.org/gen-
eralinfo/rfps/emergingmarkets20l2.pdf [hereinafter Chicago Teachers' Pension]. The minimum
threshold utilization rate of diverse broker-dealers for other asset classes are lower, but signifi-
cant asset allocations such as international equities and fixed income still require 25 percent
utilization of diverse broker-dealers under the Fund's current policy. Id.
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kerage commissions to minority broker-dealers and/or women broker-
dealers" and 5% to "emerging broker-dealers." 37
C. Other Efforts to Support Diverse Financial Enterprises
There are a number of other ways in which PPFs promote diversity
in the asset management space outside of direct hiring.
First, even for RFPs that do not specifically target minority and
women-owned asset managers, PPFs sometimes signal the importance
of diversity by asking for disclosures about the funds' employee base.
For example, a recent RFP seeking emerging markets equities manag-
ers for the Chicago Teachers' Pension Fund asks applicant funds to fill
out a matrix specifying the race and gender proportions of their entire
operations. 38 The matrix asks for disaggregated data on the number
of employees along categories of function (investment professionals,
sales, IT, etc.) and by race and gender; a completed table would be a
snapshot of the race and gender breakdown of the entire investment
management firm.39
Additionally, the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
adopted a "Diversity Principles" statement in 2006 that mandates fi-
nancial services firms to have "in place or agree to adopt written poli-
cies that promote diversity in the workforce" and demonstrate
"ongoing efforts" to do so. It requires that these firms "disclose their
firms' workforce diversity statistics in a form prescribed by the State
Treasurer during the RFP or search process. '40 It also requires an
updated "workplace diversity report" from both the firm and its
suppliers.41
It is not clear how exactly PPFs that ask for this kind of information
utilize it in their manager searches. For some, however, it is an ex-
plicit protocol to consider the make-up of the applicant manager. The
Connecticut protocol states, "Workforce diversity shall be considered
by the Treasurer when making her decision to recommend a firm to
the IAC [investment advisory committee], and the Treasurer's recom-
mendation shall include her analysis and conclusions regarding the di-
versity profile of each firm recommended. '42 Even for others that are
not so explicit in their instruction, one thing that is clear is that this
information has at least two functions. The first is that it allows PPFs
37. Napier, supra note 33, at 234.
38. See Chicago Teachers' Pension, supra note 36, at 16; Appendix A-2.
39. Id.
40. Napier, supra note 33, at 233.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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to track performance based on diversity characteristics. By collecting
information about each investment manager's racial and gender
make-up, the PPFs can compare performance of diverse managers
versus performance of nondiverse managers. Second, asking for this
information could send a signal to the investment firms themselves
that PPFs are concerned about diversity. This message could be
lighter or stronger depending on how the recipient of the information
tends to interpret the importance of diversity, but it serves a baseline
shaming function for investment managers that may have few to no
minorities and women in its employee ranks, particularly in manage-
ment and investment decision-making realms.
The latter point is important because while the specific targeted al-
locations to diverse managers influence only those managers who are
a part of the defined category, these general RFPs that ask for diver-
sity information from all applicants may influence the behavior of
non-diverse, non-emerging managers. For example, a hedge fund run
by mostly white men may find that after filling out numerous RFPs
asking for diversity matrices, and after having to put down embarrass-
ingly low numbers of women and minorities in its ranks, may choose
to pay more attention to diversity recruiting within its own
organization.
Second, CalPERS and CaISTRS have supported a third-party
database of emerging managers. In 2006, for example, the two funds
teamed up with a New York platform, Altura Capital, to allow emerg-
ing managers to join a database for free. The database would be avail-
able to a wide range of institutional investors.43 The creation and
promotion of more formal listings of diverse and emerging managers
could have a number of effects. The first is that its information-shar-
ing capabilities may make these managers more accessible to potential
clients than ever before. Second, the database makes it easier for pen-
sions and other institutions to easily track performance of these pools
against other fund indices and to track the performance of a specific
fund against the benchmark of the totality of listed diverse/emerging
funds.
Thus far, I have described the myriad ways in which PPFs have
taken steps to promote diversity in the financial sector. The tradi-
tional efforts were channeled into improving diversity on corporate
boards. I have also laid out a different approach to diversity: that
PPFs also direct efforts to hire diverse asset managers and to promote
43. See CaISTRS and CaIPERS to Build Emerging Managers and Financial Services Database,
CALSTRS (Apr. 17, 2006), available at http://www.CalSTRS.com/news-release/CaISTRS-and-
CalPERS-build-emerging-managers-and-financial-services-database.
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diversity in the asset management business. The following section ex-
plores what impetuses and rationales exist for these approaches to
diversity.
III. RATIONALES FOR PURSUING DIVERSITY INITIATIVES
Understanding the rationales behind PPFs' efforts to champion di-
versity is crucial not only to evaluating whether these practices are
prudent investment practices for a steward of public monies, but also
whether the practices are in fact legal.44 Below, I identify and evalu-
ate three likely rationales: a business case, a decision to pursue fair-
ness and equality, and political or external pressures. These rationales
are not necessarily competing, and different pensions may face differ-
ent configurations of these forces.
A. Business Case Rationale
One possible rationale is the business case for diversity promotion.
If PPFs believe that corporations are likely to have higher earnings if
they have board with more women and minorities, then the PPF will
reasonably exert power as shareholders and institutional voices to
push for more diversity on corporate boards. Similarly, if PPFs be-
lieve that investment funds run by women and minorities are more
likely to outperform other managers, they would hire more of these
investment funds to manage pension assets.
Pension funds do care about portfolio returns, even if it is not the
only factor that influences their decision-making. Defined benefit
public pensions are concerned about performance for several reasons.
First, due to factors such as lack of influx of funding from state
budgets, failure to match assets and liability durations, and losses in
asset value due to market fluctuations, pension funds are severely un-
derfunded. On an aggregate basis, U.S. public pensions have only a
38% fundedness ratio.45 No state has a fundedness ratio higher than
54% (North Carolina), and some are extremely low (Illinois has a
funded ratio of 24%).46 While it is unrealistic to expect that asset per-
formance alone will stave off the crisis in underfunded pension
44. See infra Parts IV and V.
45. See Cory Eucalitto, Promises Made, Promises Broken - The Betrayal of Pensioners and
Taxpayers, STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/pub-
lications/detail/promises-made-promises-broken-the-betrayal-of-pensionersand-taxpayers (re-
ferring to figures within the State Budget Solutions 50 State Pension Table); Appendix B.
46. Id.
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funds,47 there is strong pressure for the asset portfolio to perform as
well as possible to prevent the gap from becoming even wider and to
minimize the amount of capital the states have to raise to bridge the
gap. 48 The interim issue is that taxpayers balk at having to make up
shortfalls in pension funding, and the long-run issue is insolvency in
paying out defined benefits to pensioners. In addition, the fact that
some states are opting for the very unpopular option of cutting cost-
of-living adjustments for payouts to pensioners - and facing legal ac-
tion for doing so 49- indicates that the financial pressures are very real.
Second, the pension industry as a whole is concerned by perform-
ance peer risk. On an institutional level, pensions get bad press when
they underperform their peers, or underperform their benchmarks
more severely than their peer funds. Because most institutional inves-
tors and specifically pensions have similar asset allocations, perform-
ance variations relative to peers becomes more salient to both the
public and to trustees.50 Pension fund performance is typically re-
ported in headlines as Pension X "outperforms peers" or Pension X
"lags behind peers." 51 Chief Investment Officers of pensions are risk
averse, and their job performance sometimes cause them to be consid-
ered for positions at bigger, more prestigious funds, or can cause them
to lose their jobs. Bonus payments to some pension investment pro-
fessionals are sometimes tied to fund performance.5 2
47. See, e.g., Sage Urn, Illinois Pension Plan Blames Low State Contributions for Serious Un-
derfunding, AI-CIO.COM (Oct. 31, 2013), http://ai-cio.com/channel/REGULATION,-LEGAL/Il-
linois-Pension-Plan-Blames-Low-State-Contributions-for_SeriousUnderfunding.html.
48. See Barry B. Burr, Investments still Answer to Public DB Plan Underfunding Question,
PENSION & INV. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.pionline.com/article/20111017/PRINT/310179976/in
vestments-still-answer-to-public-db-plan-underfunding-question
49. See Justus v. State, 337 P.3d 1219 (Colo. App. 2012), rev'd, Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202
(Colo. 2014). The case against Colo. Public Employees Retirement Association was filed in
2010. First Am. Compl., Justus v. Colo., 2010-CV-1589 (Feb. 26, 2010 Colo.), available at http://
saveperacola.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/2010-02-26-class-action-complaint.pdf.
50. See Simon Mumme, Running with the Herd, 18 INV. MAGAZINE 14 (2012); The Obsession
with Peer Risk, ACTUARIES, 26-27 (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.actuaries.asn.au/Library/
AAArticles/2012/Actuaries-NOV2012-WEBP26-27.pdf; Scott Donald, Prudence under Pressure
20 (University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper 10), availa-
ble at: http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1152&context=unswwps-flrps9; Roger
Urwin, Sustainable Investment Practice, Towers Watson Technical Paper No. 1656988, at 14
(Aug. 1, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1656988.
51. See, e.g., Ted Nesi, RI Pension Fund again Lags its Peers with Return of 11.1%, WPRI.coM
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://blogs.wpri.com/2013/08/27/ri-pension-fund-again-lags-its-peers-with-re
turn-of-li-l/.
52. See, e.g., Mark Niquette & Martin Z. Braun, Texas Pension Manager Paid $1 Million
Trails Peers Who Make Less, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://wwv.bloomberg
.com/news/2012-12-13/texas-pension-manager-paid-l-million-trails-peers-who-make-less.html.
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Because portfolio performance is a priority for PPFs, it is worth ex-
amining how PPFs' diversity initiatives fit into the performance objec-
tive. First, I review existing literature on corporate diversity and
earnings. Second, I turn to the practice of hiring diverse investment
managers.
1. Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Diversity Initiatives
One hypothesis for the business case rationale is that the presence
of women and minorities on corporate boards tends to increase profit-
ability and/or stock values. There are two major strains of this
hypothesis. 53
One is that the women and minorities that would get promoted to
positions on boards are on average more likely to make positive con-
tributions to firm governance. This approach focuses on candidate-
centric characteristics. For example, some studies suggest that women
are better at financial risk management than men.5 4 In addition, the
experiences and networks of diverse groups could allow them to ac-
cess better decision-making paradigms than homogenous groups
can.55 The second general thread of reasons to think that diversity
enhances performance arises from believing there are positive interac-
tive effects of having more women and minorities on the board. Spe-
cifically, some studies suggest that the presence of women on boards
53. A number of potential rationales have been advanced; I am categorizing them here by the
main principles underpinning them. For a more comprehensive review of individual factors, see,
e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Busi-
ness Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 795, 839-40; Deborah L.
Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Dif-
ference Make? 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377 (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1685615##.
54. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence,
and Common Stock Investment, 116 QTRLY. J. ECON. 261, 285 (2001) (suggesting that women
may be more risk averse than men); Chris Bart & Gregory McQueen, Why Women Make Better
Directors, 8 INT'L J. Bus. GOVERNANCE & ETHICS. 93, 97-98 (2013) (finding that women direc-
tors scored higher on decision-making dimensions such as personal interest, normative, and com-
plex moral reasoning). See also Elsa Ermer et al., Relative Status Regulates Risky Decision
Making about Resources in Men: Evidence for the Co-evolution of Motivation and Cognition, 29
EVOLUTION & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 106 (2008); Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos & Alexandra
Bernasek, Are Women More Risk Averse? Attitude Toward Financial Risk, 36 ECON. INQUIR'Y
620, 629 (1998); Katrin Bennhold, Where Would We Be If Women Ran Wall Street?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.comJ2009/02/01/business/worldbusiness/Oliht-gender.3-420354
.html?_r=0; Sheelah Kolhatkar, What If Women Ran Wall Street?, N.Y. MAGAZINE 36 (Mar. 29,
2010), available at http://nymag.com/newsbusinessfinance/64950.
55. See, e.g., Nancy DiTomaso, Corinne Post, & Rochelle Parks-Yancy, Workforce Diversity
and Inequality: Power, Status, and Numbers, 33 ANN. REV. Soc. 473, 488 (2007); Cedric Herring,
Does Diversity Pay? Race, Gender, and the Business Case for Diversity, 74 AM. Soc. REV. 208,
208-09 (2009);
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creates a positive effect on others on the board in being more thought-
ful and prepared to make decisions,5 6 and that women might exhibit
better leadership skills in a board setting. 57
A number of studies show that the presence of women is linked to
higher profitability. For example, Catalyst, the gender-equity think
tank, found that in a universe of Fortune 500 companies, those in the
top quartile in terms of women on boards outperformed those in the
bottom quartile on return on equity, return on sales, and return on
invested capital.58 A 2003 study found that racial and gender diversity
on corporate boards was positively correlated with higher return on
investments and return on assets.59 A Credit Suisse study found that
companies with women on boards had higher returns on equity and
higher growth rates on average than companies without. 60 Moreover,
a Thomson Reuters study suggests that across the globe, companies
with more gender diversity on their boards were less volatile in per-
formance than those without women on their boards. 61 These studies
did not discuss whether racial diversity would also lead to similar
findings.
Other studies, however, call into question the proposition that the
presence of women and minorities on U.S. corporate boards tends to
improve profitability.62 In fact, though some argue that corporate di-
versity is good for business,63 other evaluators - including Deborah
Rhode - acknowledge the dearth of reliable empirical support for a
causal inference. 64 Recent studies with broad-ranging datasets have
also found a lack of relationship between corporate performance and
the appointment of women and minorities to corporate boards. A
56. See, e.g., Katherine Phillips, Gregory Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Surface-Level Di-
versity and Decision-Making in Groups: When Does Deep-Level Similarity Help?, 9 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 476, 479 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Scoyrr E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: How THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 324-38 (2007); Frank Dobbin & Jiwook
Jung, Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Insti-
tutional Investor Bias? 89 N.C. L. REV. 809, 818-19 (2011); Gender Diversity and Corporate Per-
formance, CREDIT SUISSE 18-19 (Aug. 2012); Women Matter 2, McKINSEY & Co. 2 (2008).
58. Lois Joy et al., The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women's Representation on
Boards, CATALYST (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/The-Bottom
_LineCorporatePerformance andWomensRepresentation-on Boards.pdf.
59. Niclas L. Erhardt et al., Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 11
CORP. GOVERNANCE 102, 107 (2003).
60. Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance, supra note 57.
61. Andre Chanavat & Katharine Ramsden, Mining the Metrics of Board Diversity, THOMSON
REUTERS 5 (Jun. 2013).
62. See Rhode & Packel. supra note 53, at 4-9, for a relatively comprehensive literature
review.
63. See, e.g., Letter from Anne Sheehan to Mark Zuckerberg, supra note 15.
64. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 53, at 10.
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study of firms in the S&P 500 found that there was no significant rela-
tionship between gender and ethnic diversity on boards and the firm's
return on assets or Tobin's Q (two frequently-used markers of a firm's
financial performance). 65
Furthermore, some studies have found negative relationships be-
tween increasing diversity on corporate boards and firm performance.
In addition, there are studies that counter the heterogeneity-problem-
solving narrative with one that describes the presence of diversity as
cause for inability to reach solutions.66 Others suggest adding women
to boards may lead to over-monitoring that decreases firm perform-
ance. 67 For example, one study found that increases in gender diver-
sity on U.S. corporate boards was negatively associated with Tobin's
Q; the author also hypothesized that the decline in performance may
be due to over-monitoring by women directors on boards.68 Another
study of Danish firms found a negative impact on performance in
firms with female board members who are not elected by staff.69 An
interesting analysis by Dobbin and Jung presents a competing theory
for slightly negative performance declines. They showed that gender
diversity efforts were not followed by increased firm profitability in
U.S. corporations, but later on, non-blockholding institutional inves-
tors decreased investments in these firms, which may have led to their
slightly decreased stock values. 70
In addition, a number of researchers have pointed out that the rela-
tionship between appointments of diverse boards and firm perform-
ance are not independent variables. Researchers dissecting data of
U.S. corporate boards' found that the addition of women to boards is
related to the number of women already on the board and the depar-
ture of a woman from the board previously. 71 They also found that
women tend to serve on better performing boards, which indicates the
65. David Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees
and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP. GOVIERNANCE 396, 411 (2010).
66. Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A. Neale, What Differences Make a Difference? The Prom-
ise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations. 6 Psy. Sci. PUB. INTERES-r 31, 34 (2005).
67. Renee Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on Govern-
ance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292 (2009).
68. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 67, at 305-07.
69. See Nina Smith, Vlademar Smit & Mette Verner, Do Women in Top Management Affect
Firm Performance? A panel study of 2,500 Danish firms, 55 INT'L J. PRODUCrlVITY & PERFORM-
ANCE MGMT. 569, 588 (2006).
70. See Dobbin & Jung, supra note 57, at 828-29. This finding has interesting implications for
Part C of this section, as I explore political motivations that partly drive behaviors of PPFs.
71. See Kathleen A. Farrell & Philip L. Hersch, Addition to Corporate Boards: The Effect of
Gender, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 85, 94-95 (2005); see also Charles B. Shrader, Virginia B. Blackman &
Paul lies, Women In Management And Firm Financial Performance: An Exploratory Study, 9 J.
MANAGERIAL Iss. 355, 359 (1997).
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potential endogenous effects that pervade studies of this nature. 72
Thus, although it would certainly be convenient if diversity paid off
for the bottom line, that conclusion is by no means firmly settled.
2. Effectiveness of Diverse and Emerging Manager Programs
Beyond exerting influence on corporate governance, PPFs also fo-
cus on diversity in its asset management arena. The rationales for be-
lieving that using diverse managers can help the PPF's bottom line are
not the same as the business-case rationale for diversity in corporate
governance. This section explores some potential rationales and
presents evidence that, like in the corporate board diversity context,
there is no reliable outperformance evidence for diverse and emerging
managers.
a. Theoretical Basis for Performance Advantages of
Diverse/Emerging Managers
It is possible that emerging managers might hold some unique bene-
fits over larger, older funds. Some advantages of small, new funds
include: 1) smaller AUM funds can invest in positions without trading
costs such as market impact, fast implementation, front running, etc.,
2) smaller funds can sell out of positions much more quickly than
large funds can, 3) smaller AUM funds can invest in full positions
without sacrificing liquidity problems, 4) the ability to take smaller
positions means these funds can exploit opportunities too small for
larger funds to tap into, 5) by not hitting constraints in the size of their
trades, smaller funds can focus on their very best trading ideas and
thereby escape the need to trade in strategies outside their core exper-
tise, 6) smaller and newer hedge funds have a greater motivation to
succeed because oftentimes personal money is at stake and because
they have less of a reputational cushion to fall back on.73
Rationales for the performance advantages of diverse managers,
however, would have to be more attenuated. Some research suggests
72. See Farrell & Hersch, supra note 71, at 104; Shrader et al., supra note 71, at 365. It is also
possible that women may be appointed to boards facing previous poor performance. See
Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander Haslam, The Glass Cliff: Evidence that Women are Over-
Represented in Precarious Leadership Positions, 16 BRIT. J. MGMT. 81, 83 (2005).
73. See, e.g., Emerging Manager Programs: A Best Practices Overview, supra note 22, at 3.
Sandra Parker et al., PCA Research Brief: A Review of Developing Managers and Developing
Manager Programs, PENSION CONSULrING ALLIANCE, INC. 1 (Jul. 2003), available at http://www
.pensionconsulting.comlPortals/OlUserReports/A%2Review%20of%20Developing%2OMana
gers.pdf; Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Philippe Jorion, The Performance of Emerging Hedge Fund
Managers 3-4 (AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper, Jan. 23, 2008) available at http://ssrn
.comabstract=1103215.
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that "emerging manager" and "diverse manager" have overlapping re-
sults, because historically and today, these minority and women-
owned investment managers tended to also "[fall] below investor
thresholds within mainstream investment consultant manager uni-
verse databases. ' 74 Yet emerging managers and diverse managers do
not always have overlapping characteristics. A 2013 CaIPERS report
showed that 9% of external managers across the pension fund were
diverse, and 19% of the emerging managers are diverse. 75 On an
AUM basis, 9% of the total fund external management capital was
invested with diverse managers, and 32% of the emerging manager
capital was with diverse managers. 76 In other words, emerging man-
agers were more likely to be diverse than managers in the portfolio
overall. But the bottom line is that the vast majority of emerging
managers by number and by AUM in the CalPERS portfolio were not
diverse managers. Some diverse managers are neither new managers
nor small managers. Some small and new managers are not diverse.
We already know that small AUM and relatively new tenure might
carry some advantages, as explicated above. But PPFs might be inter-
ested in advantages that are unique to the identity of the fund owners
and managers themselves. For example, there are some organiza-
tional management theories suggesting that women may be better
money managers than men because they are less likely to take on un-
due risk.77 Other possible reasoning include the idea that funds
headed by minorities can access capital and opportunities in commu-
nities populated by these minorities, would may not have been availa-
ble to funds managed by white managers. This could be particularly
salient in private equity and infrastructure investments, where the re-
lationship between the fund manager and the investment opportunity
is more organic and face-to-face than trading relationships between
portfolio managers and traders behind a Bloomberg terminal. Finally,
it is possible that strategies by nontraditional minority money manag-
ers could tap into uncorrelated return streams, which, even if not out-
performing on returns, could add diversification to the portfolio
overall and lower risk.
74. Emerging Manager Programs: A Best Practices Overview, supra note 22, 2-3.
75. Emerging & Diverse Manager Data Report, CALPERS 5 (Mar. 2013), available at http://
www.CalPERS.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/pubs/data-report.pdf.
76. Id. at 6.
77. See Barber & Odean, supra note 54, at 283-84.
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b. Empirical Evaluation of Diverse/Emerging
Manager Performance
It is uncontroversial that pension funds generally seek managers
who are most likely to deliver higher performance at lower risk. How-
ever, no reliable study demonstrates that investment funds managed
or owned by minorities and women tend to outperform their counter-
parts. There has not been a robust comparison of these diverse man-
agers' relative performance. Research on emerging managers -
categorized based on size or age of the fund - showing some perform-
ance advantages tend to not be performed by independent, peer-re-
viewed studies. Thus, whether emerging or diverse managers tend to
outperform their traditional counterparts is far from settled in empiri-
cal studies and in the realized experience of investors. The following
exchange between Orim Graves, the Executive Director of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Professionals and the CalPERS CIO
Joe Dear at the CalPERS Emerging Manager Forum in December
2012 is particularly telling:
Orim Graves: So I think from the mindset of how you kind of ap-
proach the emerging manager, diverse manager sector, is one that
should look at it not as, not as much of a chance as it is a, probably a
good bet to make that investment .... Is that correct?
Joe Dear: It's mixed. It's mixed Orim. It's not a slam across the
board success.7
8
In fact, in a March 2013 comprehensive report comparing the histori-
cal performance of the CalPERS Emerging Manager portfolio with
that of the rest of the portfolio concluded that
Performance of emerging managers varies, and based on CalPERS
experience, we cannot draw a broad conclusion about performance
of emerging managers .... As a group, emerging managers out-
performed non-emerging managers in certain asset classes and un-
derperformed non-emerging managers in others.
Similarly, performance of woman and minority owned managers
was mixed across the asset classes. This is consistent with CalPERS
experience with non-emerging and non-women and minority-owned
managers. There is typically significant dispersion of performance
across managers and strategies in the CalPERS investment
portfolio.
79
Even within the emerging manager category, the results are mixed.
One study found "no broad-based differences in investment perform-
78. Transcript Part 2 of General Session at 13, CaIPERS Emerging Manager Forum (Dec. 3
2012), available at http://www.CalPERS.ca.gov/eip-docs/investments/general-session-part-2.pdf
[hereinafter Transcript Part 2].
79. Emerging & Diverse Manager Data Report, supra note 76, at 5.
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ance or investment risk between developing and mainline managers"
of domestic equities.80 Other studies have elicited some strands of
evidence to show that "young" investment funds tend to outperform
their larger, more conventional counterparts. For example, a study by
Investcorp, an alternative investment manager, found that emerging
managers outperformed their larger counterparts by 130 basis points
per year at lower risk. 81 Another unpublished study, by academic re-
searchers at the University of Minnesota and the University of Cali-
fornia, also reported outperformance by newer funds relative to their
more established peers. 82 The authors of these studies acknowledged
that there is risk of bias because many emerging managers only begin
reporting their returns to tracking databases when the returns are
good.83 They attempt to account for this "backfill bias" by eliminating
pre-reporting date returns or by only considering funds whose incep-
tion date was the same as their initial reporting date.8 4 However, even
these measures will still result in over-reporting the performance of
nascent funds, because of the funds that never report their perform-
ance or go belly-up before having good enough returns to want to
report. In other words, while studies can account for backfill bias to a
certain extent, they cannot account for survivorship and sampling bias.
Ultimately, there just are not enough studies that rigorously evaluate
the performance of emerging and diverse managers.
c. Business Case Rationale in Light of Uncertainty
Given the lack of definitive evidence, one might conclude that there
is no "business case rationale" for emerging and diverse manager pro-
grams. However, it is still possible that performance-based justifica-
tions could figure into the PPFs' calculus. I explain how by charting
through three scenarios for how PPFs might think through the issue.
In one scenario, PPFs believe that their traditional methods of eval-
uating managers: soundness of investment strategy, diversified return
stream, long record of good historical performance, large institutional
asset base, and ability to provide in-house operational and logistical
services, are the best methods for evaluating whether to hire a man-
ager. Under this scenario, PPFs would not rationally pursue emerging
manager and diversity manager programs, which might not be able to
80. See Parker et al., supra note 73, at 10.
81. Deepak Gurnani, Ludge Hentschel, & Nirav Shah, Emerging Hedge Funds: A Source of
Alpha, INVEsrcORP, 9, 14 (Oct. 2010), available at http://u15474470.onlinehome-server.com/lib/
docs/112202-emerginghedgefundsfinal.pdf.
82. Aggarwal & Jorion, supra note 74, at 30.
83. Deepak Gurnani et. al., supra note 81, at 13.
84. Id.
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meet those parameters. Those funds that do meet the parameters
would be found in traditional search, but of course, this approach does
not explain the behavior of PPFs engaged in nontraditional searches
for managers: namely, those who are searching for emerging and di-
verse managers instead.
In a second scenario, PPFs believe that there are unique merits to
emerging and diverse funds. For example, they may believe that mi-
nority managers are more likely to deliver uncorrelated return
streams that decrease risk in the overall portfolio. They may believe
in restrictions on fund size, AUM, and traditional pipelines for fund
names are artificial constraints that might cause some outperforming
funds to be overlooked. These PPFs would rationally pursue the strat-
egy of lifting those restrictions from their manager selection process.
So if a PPF were persuaded that smaller funds are better able to ac-
cess investment opportunities, they could simply remove the AUM re-
striction on their RFPs for certain asset mandates, and smaller funds
could apply. PPFs could even allow smaller funds to pool into ad-hoc
groups to access larger mandates. This way, the best and most attrac-
tive asset managers regardless of AUM, age, and name recognition/
identity could win RFPs.
But under this scenario, it is difficult to see why these PPFs would
want to create separate programs to block out bigger, more established
funds from competition. However, some PPFs currently run their
Emerging Manager programs as a restricted set-aside model, where
only these Emerging Managers could participate. This suggests that
PPFs do not follow the second scenario's line of thinking.
Finally, under a third scenario, the PPFs might be uncertain about
the merits of some of the issues described above.8 5 For example, they
may think that sometimes smaller funds can trade in and out of posi-
tions more nimbly, but they prefer the stability of a larger fund that
has handled large institutional assets. They may think that women-
headed investment firms are better at times of crisis, but may not be
so sure in this belief. Thus, they created emerging managers and di-
verse manager programs to experiment, and in so doing, need to pre-
sent positive, definitive justifications for their doing so (it simply does
not sound good to say, "these programs might be good, so we are try-
ing them out.") Of course, this might not be a completely rational
strategy for a profit maximizing organization. However, when com-
85. Despite the lack of solid empirical data showing the performance benefits of emerging and
diverse managers, it is not surprising that PPFs have nevertheless lauded these funds for present-
ing attractive investment opportunities. After all, these institutional investors must advance
some rationales for investing in these nontraditional external managers.
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bined with other potential political or equity-based advantages, this
approach might be enough for some institutions to give diversity a try.
3. Size of Business Case Impact
Finally, even if there were some grounds to believe that diversity
promotion is good for business, a subsequent, more difficult question
is "how good"? Results are difficult to quantify when it comes to ef-
forts to promote corporate board diversity. The result of a preference
to vote for diverse candidates only goes so far as there are plausibly
qualified board candidates available, that there are no other interven-
ing factors that would drive the funds to vote otherwise, and that
other voters would not overwhelm the power of PPFs as shareholders.
On the lobbying front, it is unclear how much the PPFs' efforts con-
tributed to the SEC's successful passage of the diversity statement
rule, nor is it clear that simply requiring companies to disclose how
they take diversity into account in board selection will yield a different
board composition. Finally, the support for third parties could be in-
fluential, but only insofar as these third parties are successful in actu-
ally catapulting diverse candidates into positions on boards, and
whether the contributions to the cause are sufficient.
On the investment management front, however, the level of conse-
quence visited by having an emerging - diversity manager program is
more quantifiable. After all, investment managers are typically mea-
sured based on their performance, i.e. whether they have generated
adequate return at a suitable level of risk. The inclusion of some man-
agers that are not selected solely based on the pure potential to maxi-
mize Sharpe Ratio could be viewed as negatively consequential.
However, as the aforementioned analyses suggest, there is no specific
study pointing to significant underperformance by emerging and di-
verse managers. Thus, though it is perhaps possible to identify just
how much emerging and diverse managers contribute to or detract
from performance, we have no tools to do so.
Thus, for different reasons, we are unable to answer the question of
just how consequential is it for PPFs' bottom line to pursue these di-
versity initiatives. With that, we turn to other potential justifications
for doing so.
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B. Equality-Based Rationale
PPFs might also want to pursue diversity initiatives because they
believe equality is inherently desirable. 86 In this section, I explore evi-
dence that PPFs are interested in rectifying inequality. There are two
different - though by no means mutually exclusive - approaches.
First, PPFs may believe that there is a need to remove discriminatory
barriers in the investment manager search process. The cause of the
discrimination can come in a number of ways. The most broad-based
version is the belief that women and racial minorities are less likely to
enter the financial industry and specifically the asset management in-
dustry because of societal factors: overt discrimination, lack of role
models, or signals that direct women and minorities away from these
careers or leadership roles within that career.
The casual story can also be told through a structuralist lens. For
example, if access to capital and access to leadership positions tend to
rest within the hands of those who already have power, then it follows
that corporations tend to be run by white men. They had access to the
positions and opportunities that can make someone both "board
ready" and well-known to other voters. In the asset management con-
text, large, established funds that already are well known and have
tapped into institutional capital bases have an easier time getting insti-
tutional clients. A fund run by a white, male, Harvard Business
School graduate that began in the early 1990s is more likely to have
access to capital based on "who" the fund is. Investors may be fo-
cused on the performance of the fund, but may have selected it over
lesser-known but equally good performers. On the other hand, a fund
launched last year by a talented Latina in New Mexico could be quite
good if it were given enough capital and opportunity to succeed, but
may not ever be able to do so because it never had the opportunity.
The Illinois State Pension Board made a note of this approach in the
fund's Investment Policy, explaining that
[E]ven large, experienced and successful investment organizations
were once small, start-up firms with few assets under management.
Today many such firms are owned by minorities, women and per-
sons with a disability. These firms are often started by experienced
investment professionals, who show great promise, but find it diffi-
cult to compete with large majority owned organizations. 87
86. See Fairfax, supra note 5, for a discussion of the shift from the equality-based rationale to
a business-based rationale. David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diver-
sity Is Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004).
87. ILL. STATE BD. OF INV., INv. POL'Y 68 (last amended Dec. 5, 2014), available at www
.illinois.gov/isbi/Documents/Investment-Policy.pdf.
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The second approach to the equality rationale focuses not on the
causal story but rather on the implications of the reality of under-
representation. PPFs have expressed a desire to have the managers of
pension assets be closer aligned with the racial and gender
demographics of the underlying pensioner communities. In other
words, there may be a keen sense that white men should not control
the future financial fates of pension beneficiaries of different races
and genders. A similar rationale is probably used for choosing the
board of trustees for pension funds, who are rarely as uniformly white
and male as the investment community. For example, CaISTRS re-
leased a report on the history of its diversity-seeking efforts, noting
that
Historically, teaching has been a progressive profession where
women have enjoyed a rich stronghold and where diversity has been
fully embraced. However, the investment management industry has
not been as far along in its development as educators; it has been
bound by traditional ways and beliefs. Thus, diversity in the man-
agement of investments is a concept that has gained momentum and
has been more prevalent in recent years, partly due to the change in
demographics in the United States and partly due to forward-think-
ing leadership. 88
As this account reveals, there is cache in the idea that the demo-
graphic composition of a particular institution should set some expec-
tations for the composition of the group that is tasked with leading,
managing, or implementing policies and outcomes. As Henry Jones,
the Chair of the CalPERS Investment Committee, stated at a public
conference, "As the largest public pension fund in the nation, within
the nation's most ethnically and culturally diverse state, we can't reach
our full potential without having the broadest pool of talent to work
with." 89 Jones's remarks once again imply that there is something spe-
cial about the demographic diversity of California public employees
that makes it even more important for the pension to pursue diversity
initiatives. It could be seen as a democratic mandate, or a sort of an
effort to avoid delegitimization. This theory is less connected to dis-
criminatory practices, but rather focuses on the underrepresentation
outcomes.
88. Semi-annual Report on Diversity in the Management of Investments, CALSTRS 1 (Nov. 1,
2007), available at http://www.CaISTRS.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/diversity-invest
ments-mgmt.pdf.
89. Transcript Part 1 of General Session at 3, CalPERS Emerging Manager Forum (Dec. 3
2012), available at http://www.CalPERS.ca.gov/eip-docs/investments/general-session-part-1.pdf
[hereinafter Transcript Part 1].
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Even though these two rationales are social-justice based, they may
envelop an embedded performance concern as well. Because smaller
and minority-owned funds have a harder time accessing pools of capi-
tal, having set-aside incubators for them could reap great rewards
when some of them ultimately succeed based on that initial grant. In
other words, opportunity begets more opportunity, and PPFs are of-
fering a sliver of opportunity to those who may be able to seize it and
build on it. As long as the reward of enabling the success of some
diverse and emerging managers who otherwise would not have made
it outweighs the overall costs of running an emerging and diverse
manager program, it may still be worth it from a "performance" per-
spective for PPFs, particularly larger ones, to pursue these initiatives.
Of course, some are "displeased that these emerging managers re-
ceive preferential treatment." 90 Skeptics of emerging and diverse
manager programs would argue that opportunities to invest should be
based on track records and parameters grounded in investment strat-
egy evaluations, not on future hopes of future success. However, as
the next section shows, there may be countervailing political pressures
to offset these criticisms.
C. Political Pressures
A third reason for PPFs to pursue diversity initiatives may be due to
external political pressures. In other words, even if there is no busi-
ness case for diversity, nor do the funds firmly believe in promoting
diversity as a justice-based imperative, they may still be motivated to
do so because other forces propel them to do so.91
There is some evidence that political pressure constitutes a part of
the impetus to pursue diversity manager programs. Some of this pres-
sure manifests in legislative action, as several states have passed legis-
lation promoting "emerging" managers, some with explicit mandates
to consider diversity. Three states that adopted legislation did so with
a strong, explicit aim to increase diversity. Maryland's House Bill
1277, which passed unanimously in 2008, stipulated that the Boards of
Trustees of various state funds, including the State Retirement Pen-
sion System, "direct the Investment Committee to attempt to use the
90. See Ashby Monk, Why Asset Management Needs More Emerging Manager programs, IN-
STITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Oct. 16, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.institutionalinvestor.comblogarti
cle/3103927/why-asset-management-needs-more-emerging-manager-programs.html.
91. See, e.g., John Entine, The Politicization of Public Investments, in PENSION FUND POLITICS:
THE DANGERS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 1, 3-7 (John Entine ed. 2005) (providing a
number of examples of politically motivated pension investment decisions); Roberta Romano,
Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795,
803-08 (1993) (describing a number of politically-driven public pension investment decisions).
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greatest extent feasible minority business enterprises to provide bro-
kerage and investment management services to the board. '92 The bill
was remarkable for its attempt to maximize minority manager partici-
pation. It was sponsored by members of the Maryland legislature's
Black Caucus, and was unanimously passed.93
Another example of potential political pressures at play is Califor-
nia. While one might expect Californian funds to be subject to pres-
sure against diversity initiatives given that a 1996 voter referendum,
Proposition 209, amended the state constitution to prohibit the state
from considering gender, race, and ethnicity in public contracts and
employment, 94 California's funds as a whole are some of the biggest
supporters of diversity initiatives generally. Both CalPERS and
CalSTRS have been pioneers in the development of emerging man-
ager platforms.
California's statutes on Emerging Managers do not consider race
and gender explicitly. California's 2011 Senate Bill 294 required that
the boards of CalPERS and CalSTRS create a "five-year strategic
plan for emerging investment manager participation across all asset
classes," and that the boards submit annual reports to the legisla-
ture.95 The reason that California statute does not specify minority
status as a qualification for its emerging manager program is that Pro-
position 209 prevents it from doing so.
92. See MD. CODE. ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 21-116(d)(1)(i) (2008).
93. Id. Illinois passed a similar law in 2009 to increase the utilization of emerging managers,
which are defined by both size and owner (minorities, women, or individuals with disabilities). 40
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-109.1 (2012). In 2010, New York also updated its Retirement and Social
Security Law to renew a commitment to minority businesses in the pension context. N.Y. RE-
TIRE. & SOC. SEC. § 423-c (Consol. 2010). The Illinois statute does not in itself mandate a minor-
ity manager program, but rather leaves it to the "discretion of the state comptroller." Id.
However, it lists out a number of possibilities for increasing "utilization of MWBE asset manag-
ers" and other financial firms. Id. For asset managers, it includes "allocating investments of
assets of the common retirement fund either through: (i) direct investments in the equities and
debt securities of MWBEs; or (ii) indirectly through special programs involving MWBE asset
managers." Id. at 423-c.1.(c).
94. Proposition 209: Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment by State
and Other Public Entities. Initiative Constitutional Amendment (Nov. 5, 1996), available at
http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/BP/209.htm (enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31). "The state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public edu-
cation, or public contracting." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
95. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22228 (2011). California's precise definition of "emerging manager"
is left up to the investment boards, but Proposition 209 precludes explicit accounting for race.
See CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 31. Thus, the definition generally must be along lines of size and age
of the fund.
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Notwithstanding Proposition 209,96 there is significant political
pressure in California to continue promoting diversity initiatives. For
example, CalPERS and CalSTRS came under fire by diversity organi-
zations after scaling back its emerging manager programs in private
equity. In 2012, supporters of the Toigo Foundation, which is dedi-
cated to promoting diversity and has had a longstanding relationship
with CalPERS, wanted to remove the fund's CIO from the annual
gala program because of their dissatisfaction with CalPERS's failure
to pay more attention to emerging and diverse managers. One report
of the tensions noted that "Many emerging managers believe
CalPERS is withdrawing its support for the segment - preferring in-
stead to write bigger cheques for the larger, top-performing managers
who can offer a better deal on fees" and that they believe "CalPERS'
commitment to the strategy is waning. '97 The managers complained
that the fund had declined reinvestment in these funds and further
communication about its decisions. This led to special hearings of the
California state senate "in part to investigate the perception that the
pension system had been inequitable in its manager selection. ' 98 Dur-
ing the meetings, CaIPERS CIO Joe Dear reiterated the fund's com-
mitment to diversity. However, the fund noted in a later report that
the performance of emerging managers was not positive across the
board, and the same was the case for diversity managers. 99
These exchanges indicate that the PPFs must walk a delicate line
while three forces bear upon its decision-making. First: being respon-
sive to the demands of the community of diversity stakeholders, sec-
ond: bringing home high returns for pensioners, and, to the extent
necessary, third: abiding by state restrictions on explicitly considering
race or gender (for example, Proposition 209's parameters). The re-
straints created by Proposition 209 certain bring the California funds
close to the juncture of the community demands. At a conference in
2012 that included members of the California legislature, the influen-
96. Proposition 209 is here to stay unless the voters of California reverse their position. The
Supreme Court has upheld a similar ballot initiative in Michigan in Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). See, e.g., State Proposal - 06-2: Constitu-
tional Amendment: Ban Affirmative Action Programs, MICH.GOV, http://miboecfr.nictusa.com/
electionlresultsl06GEN/90000002.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). The language is the same as
California's Proposition 209. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2). Other states have successfully
instituted similar programs, including Washington State's Initiative 200 (Dec. 3, 1998), the One
Florida Initiative (Feb. 22, 2000) and Nebraska's ban of affirmative action on both racial and
gender lines via Initiative 424 (Nov. 4, 2008).
97. Christopher Witkowsky, CalPERS' emerging manager problem, PRIVATE EOurY INT'L 1,
4 (Oct. 12, 2012).
98. Id. at 6.
99. Emerging & Diverse Manager Data Report, supra note 75, at 5.
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tial Toigo Foundation, and other diversity lobbyists, 100 CalPERS CIO
Joe Dear made the following statement:
[A]s all of you in this room know, CaiPERS has to work within the
confines of California's proposition 209. That means we cannot es-
tablish goals or targets for placement of external investment based
on race, ethnicity, color or gender. That makes management of
these programs more difficult, because if you're managing and you
have a goal, you know what you're kind of doing.10 1
Dear continued to explain that the reason attention to California's
Emerging Manager program work is because statistically speaking,
promoting the pool of emerging managers will inevitably promote mi-
nority managers within that pool. "[D]iverse managers make up a
greater proportion of the emerging manager community than they do
in the overall investment manager community," he stated. "For this
reason, we remain committed and confident that we can meet the ex-
pectations of the diverse manager community by focusing on emerg-
ing manager programs, and stay within the confines of California
law."' 0 2
Thus, though it may be the case that individual pension fund man-
agers - and perhaps even some investment committees and boards -
may not otherwise be driven to promote diversity, the pressure of po-
litical forces push some funds toward that direction. That political
pressure need not literally come from the legislature, but as the Cali-
fornia example demonstrated, there is a certain degree of commit-
ment accountability that public pension funds face. This is consistent
with the Dobbins and Jung finding that institutional investors are gen-
der-biased, but that appearances ("accountability apprehension") will
"mediate" the process. Their specific finding on this issue is that em-
pirically, investors decrease holdings in a company if females are ap-
pointed to board unless they believe they will be held politically
accountable for such actions. In the PPF diversity manager context,
the legislature, lobbyists, and other third parties all serve as "account-
ability" agents that steer funds toward pursuing diversity initiatives,
against the countervailing pressures of performance results and anti-
affirmative-action measures.
100. Including the National Association of Security Professional, the New America Alliance,
the National Association of Investment Companies; the Association of Asian American Invest-
ment Managers; the California Legislative Black Caucus, the California Latino Legislative Cau-
cus, and the California Asian Pacific Islander Legislative Caucus. See 2012 Forum Archive,
CALPERS (last accessed Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.CalPERS.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/
targeted-programs/2012-archive.xml.
101. Transcript Part 1, supra note 89, at 8.
102. Id.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PURSUING DIVERSITY:
THE "STRICT SCRUTINY STRAIGHTJACKET"
Even if PPFs make decisions to pursue diversity hiring initiatives in
light of uncertainty about performance outcomes, they also face an-
other external uncertainty: whether they will get sued for doing it. In
this section, I contend that there are serious legal risks to states' diver-
sity-promotion programs. This issue is most significant for the hiring
of minority asset managers to invest PPF funds. Though to date there
do not appear to have been any litigations against pension funds on
the grounds that their diverse manager programs may violate Equal
Protection Clause, I argue that these programs as they currently stand
are at risk of demise when reviewed under the Supreme Court's cur-
rent affirmative action jurisprudence. While these programs might
promote positive social change, the means of the attempt may render
their project danger. Thus, even supporters of diversity initiatives
should be concerned about the existential risks for these programs
given current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's review of race-based affirmative action pro-
grams focuses primarily on two areas: education and government con-
tracting. In those two areas, it has recognized "two interests that
qualify as compelling": diversity in higher education, and remedying
past discrimination. 10 3 Though attention to education has over-
whelmed affirmative action discourse in the past decade or so, the
Court's government contracting jurisprudence is directly applicable to
PPFs' diversity manager programs. That jurisprudence is not so
favorable to these programs. The Court has held that the standard of
review for all race-conscious government actions, whether insidious or
remedial, is that of strict scrutiny. Both state and federal government
contracting programs are subject to this standard, according to City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 104 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena. 05 Diverse manager programs face significant constitutional
hurdles. As Justice Marshall warned in his dissent in Croson, the ma-
jority's application of strict scrutiny to all race-conscious state action
outfits a "strict scrutiny straitjacket" on states and localities seeking to
implement minority hiring programs. 10 6
103. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720-22 (2007).
Other interests, such as the "role model" theory, were rejected. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986). Still others, like racial isolation, have not been fully con-
firmed or rejected. See Fisher v. Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at
788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
104. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
105. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995).
106. Croson, 488 U.S. at 555 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In this Part, I first explain why PPF diversity programs are race-
based classifications subject to constitutional scrutiny. Then, I provide
a brief history of the development of the law of affirmative action and
the prevailing standard of review. Next, I provide a detailed analysis
of the current standards that government race-conscious contracting
programs must meet to satisfy constitutional requirements. Because
courts might use an array of empirical evidence to make decisions
about remedial measures, thereby creating a great deal of uncertainty
over what a program needs to show to pass constitutional muster, I
map out a matrix of past standards that have been used. Finally, I
apply those standards to PPF funds. I conclude that the difficult crite-
ria promulgated by strict scrutiny review, when applied to PPFs' di-
verse manager programs suggest that these initiatives face serious risk
of failing constitutional review should they be challenged in court.
A. PPF Diversity Programs as Race-Conscious State Action
Whenever a public pension fund puts out a search for a minority-
owned investment manager, it triggers strict scrutiny, because it has
taken a state action that classifies on the basis of race. This is so re-
gardless of how the statute is written, or if there is a statute at all.
According to Croson and Adarand, all government programs that use
racial classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny. In short, when
a PPF hires a minority asset manager, that relationship is one akin to
the City of Richmond in Croson hiring contractors who use minority
subcontractors.1 0 7
Diverse manager programs like the ones in Maryland, Illinois, and
New York arise from legislative action that categorize on the basis of
race and gender. For example, the Maryland law states:
Consistent with minority business purchasing standards applicable
to units of State government under the State Finance and Procure-
ment Article and consistent with the fiduciary duties of the Board of
107. The argument that the PPF-asset manager relationship is one between a government
employer and employee fails. First, the fund itself is not an employee of the government; neither
are the fund's employees. No employment contract exists; rather, a contract on services is drawn
up. Second, in the aftermath of some recent corruption scandals, such as pay-to-play schemes
involving pension funds, New York State now mandates that investment managers seeking to
influence procurement (even for themselves) would have to register as third-party lobbyists. See
Letter from Michael A. Cardozo, Corp. Counsel, City of N.Y. Law Dep't, to the Honorable
Michael McSweeney, City Clerk, 5-6 (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/
downloads/pdf/placmentagents.pdf. In any case, courts have also used the Croson and Adarand
analysis for government remedial actions that do not involve contracting, including for contexts
like building public housing units, see, e.g., Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 982 (5th
Cir. 1999), and government hiring practices, see, e.g., Rutherford v. City of Cleveland, 179 F.
App'x 366, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Trustees, the Board of Trustees shall direct the Investment Commit-
tee to attempt to use to the greatest extent feasible minority busi-
ness enterprises to provide brokerage and investment management
services to the Board. 108
Minority business enterprises are defined in Maryland as legal entities
that are "at least 51 % owned and controlled by one or more individu-
als who are socially and economically disadvantaged," as well as man-
aged by one of these owners.10 9 "Socially and economically
disadvantaged" people are in turn defined as "a citizen or legal U.S.
resident who is African American, Native American, Asian, Hispanic,
physically or mentally disabled, a woman, or otherwise found by the
State's MBE certification agency to be socially and economically
disadvantaged."10
As the above language indicates, the law triggers racial classifica-
tions. These statutes were not passed without notice of the risk that
they may trigger racial classification. In a letter addressed to Mary-
land Governor Martin J. O'Malley, the Maryland Attorney General
Douglas Gansler discussed this exact issue. The letter stated that the
Maryland Attorney General interpreted the term acting "consistent
with minority business purchasing standards" to be not the same as
making the funds "actually . . . subject to those provisions.""' It cites
a state lower court case that interpreted "consistent with" in the con-
fines of a local zoning law as not entirely requiring compliance. This,
the Maryland Attorney General states, means the bill should not be
read to employ race-conscious action. 112 The letter also argues that
because the bill instructs the Maryland investment funds to act within
their fiduciary duties, which would "include avoiding action likely to
lead to meritorious action against the funds." 113
Both arguments are almost certain to fail. First and most impor-
tantly, the practical effect of following the law's demand is for the
individual funds to put out REPs that search for minority managers,
which in itself is a state action that categorizes on the basis of race.
The threshold inquiry of racial classification here triggers strict scru-
tiny and all its attendant inquiries. Second, the interpretation of the
108. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 21-116(d)(1)(i) (2012).
109. Fiscal and Policy Note SB 06: State Government - Brokerage and Investment Management
Services - Use of Minority Business Enterprises, MD. DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS. 3 (2008),
available at http://www.mwbeunited.orgfPDFs/Maryland-SenateBill606.pdf.
110. Id.
111. Letter from Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, Office of Counsel to the
General Assembly, to The Honorable Martin J. O'Malley, Governor of Maryland, 2 (May 15,
2008).
112. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at 2.
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term "consistent with" as not required seems unlikely to hold water,
especially when the bill also requires the funds to produce reports
showing progress in minority business utilization.114 It is not plausible
to argue that an agency that is not "actually... subject to those provi-
sions" must also produce progress reports to show how much progress
it has made on "those provisions." Third, the argument that including
the phrase "consistent with the fiduciary duties" would preclude race-
conscious actions ironically contradicts the Attorney General's first
argument that the word consistent with" does not mean "subject to."
Finally, the argument that the funds' acting consistent with fiduciary
duties would mean they would not take any race-conscious action is a
logical fallacy that simply begs the question. Unless the Attorney
General is suggesting that the funds do not take any race-conscious
actions at all out of fiduciary duty (which would make the law itself a
dead letter), the argument that the moniker "fiduciary duty" could
automatically free a race-classifying statute from constitutional scru-
tiny will not go far. The Attorney General's letter admits that, "Read
literally, the requirement that the agencies use minority business en-
terprises 'to the greatest extent feasible,' would require that an MBE
be favored in contracting regardless of the qualifications of other bid-
ders[.] '11 5 It then adds that under such a reading, it would be impossi-
ble for the law to survive strict scrutiny. 116
The Illinois statute also triggers a race-based classification. Its
"emerging manager" program applies to funds between $10 million
and $10 billion in assets "and is a 'minority owned business,' 'female
owned business' or 'business owned by a person with a disability' as
those terms are defined in the Business Enterprise for Minorities, Fe-
114. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 21-116(d)(4) (2012). The bill states specifically:
On or before September 1 each year, the Investment Committee shall submit a report
to the Board of Trustees, the Governor's Office of Minority Affairs and, subject to
§ 2-1246 of the State Government Article, the General Assembly on:
(i) the identity of the minority business enterprise brokerage and investment manage-
ment services firms used by the Investment Committee in the immediately preceding
fiscal year;
(ii) the percentage and dollar value of the assets that are under the control of the
Investment Committee that are under the investment control of minority business en-
terprise brokerage and investment management services firms for each allocated asset
class; and
(iii) the measures the Investment Committee undertook in the immediately preceding
fiscal year in accordance with paragraph (2)(ii) of this subsection.
Id.
115. Letter from Douglas F. Gansler to The Honorable Martin J. O'Malley, supra note 111, at
2.
116. Id. (describing why it would not pass compelling state interest or narrow tailoring tests).
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males, and Persons with Disabilities Act."'1 7 Pursuant to that defini-
tion, the current law for emerging managers in Illinois pensions and
other funds states:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois to
encourage the trustees of public employee retirement systems, pen-
sion funds, and investment boards to use emerging investment man-
agers in managing their system's assets, encompassing all asset
classes, and increase the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of its
fiduciaries, to the greatest extent feasible within the bounds of finan-
cial and fiduciary prudence, and to take affirmative steps to remove
any barriers to the full participation in investment opportunities af-
forded by those retirement systems, pension funds, and investment
boards....
If in any case an emerging investment manager meets the criteria
established by a board for a specific search and meets the criteria
established by a consultant for that search, then that emerging in-
vestment manager shall receive an invitation by the board of trust-
ees, or an investment committee of the board of trustees, to present
his or her firm for final consideration of a contract.' 18
Though the language of the first excerpted portion is of encourage-
ment of minority business use rather than that of prescription, encour-
agement has been recognized by courts to be enough to trigger strict
scrutiny.1 1 9 Furthermore, the second excerpted portion of the statute
indicates that race and gender will be used as a means of awarding
preference. Not every investment manager will be invited by the
board to present for final consideration. The fact that minority man-
agers get a fast track to the final interview means that they have been
awarded an advantage on the basis of race. This squarely fits within
the realm of racial classification as contemplated by Adarand and nu-
merous other affirmative action cases. For example, in Adarand, the
regulation that provided incentives to hire minority contractors did
not require it, and did not set a quota. 120 Strict scrutiny thus "applies
117. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-109.1(b)(4) (2014).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. F.C.C., 154 F.3d 487, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[I]t is
the fact of encouragement . . . that makes this regulation a racial classification."); Monterey
Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A person suffers injury in fact if the
government requires or encourages as a condition of granting him a benefit that he discriminate
against others based on their race or sex."); Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati, 169 Ohio App.
3d 627, 641, 2006-Ohio-6452, 864 N.E.2d 116,126 rev'd, 118 Ohio St. 3d 283, 2008-Ohio-2337, 888
N.E.2d 1068 ("When regulations pressure or encourage contractors to hire minority subcontrac-
tors, courts must apply strict scrutiny.").
120. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 262 (1995).
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to all racial classifications, not just those creating binding racial
preferences."1 2 1
As is with the case with most states that employ diversity manager
initiatives, the practical means by which the Illinois pension actually
carries out the statute results in a state action that classifies on the
basis of race. For example, the Investment Guidelines for Illinois sets
out apportionment for utilizing minority managers. For example, In-
vestment Guidelines for Illinois sets out apportionments for minority
managers. In 2009 it was 30% for fixed income managers and 10 to
12% for equities managers.122 These set-aside allocations in them-
selves are racial classifications subject to constitutional review.
Other PPFs do not have statutory prescriptions, but nevertheless
would trigger strict scrutiny because they implement a race-based clas-
sification when it puts out a search for a diverse manager. For exam-
ple, though the state of Pennsylvania does not have a diverse manager
statute, when the Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement puts
out a search for a diverse manager on its website, and the only funds
that could qualify are "minority-, woman-, or disabled-owned firm"
with an office in Philadelphia that has an AUM of less than $2 bil-
lion. 123 That is a government action that classifies on the basis of race.
There is an open question of whether programs like that of
CalPERS and CalSTRS trigger strict scrutiny. Though both funds
herald racial and gender diversity as important goals, and though they
both keep track of minority and women-owned investment managers
in its reports on their emerging manager programs, the statute leaves
the Boards of both funds to decide what "emerging manager" means,
and they have decided to use only size and age of prospective funds as
criteria.12 4 If the administration of these funds does not involve state
action that draws racial lines of any sort, then these plans probably
would not be subject to strict scrutiny, or run afoul of Prop 209. On
the other hand, if there is evidence that certain minority funds get
preference within the broader race-neutral framework of emerging
121. Virdi v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 135 F. App'x 262, 267 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in
original).
122. Illinois State Board Of Investment, Illinois State Board of Investment Targeted Invest-
ment Policy, Form Request for Competitive Proposal: Investment Consultant, ILLINOIS.Gov 17
(Dec. 18, 2009).
123. Kevin Olsen, Philadelphia Pension Board Eyes Emerging Managers for International Eq-
uity, PENSIONS & INV. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.pionline.com/article/20140102/ONLINE/
140109978/philadelphia-pension-board-eyes-emerging-managers-for-internationa-equity.
124. Laurie Weir, CalPERS Emerging Manager and Diverse Manager Forum: CalPERS Five
Year Emerging Manager Plan, CALPERS 4 (Dec. 3, 2012), available at https://www.CatPERS.ca
.gov/eip-docs/investments/emerging-manager.pdf.
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funds, the funds might end up facing strict scrutiny review. For exam-
ple, if CalPERS and CalSTRS are loathe to fire minority funds be-
cause of fear of backlash from various interest groups, 125 that might
become suspect. 126 Other programs that are not explicitly wholly
race- or gender- based could still trigger strict scrutiny. For example,
North Carolina's program has a facial requirement of managers of
large-cap U.S. equities that are registered under the '40 Act and have
an AUM between $100 million and $2 billion, but adds that "consis-
tent with the Treasurer's fiduciary duty under North Carolina General
Statute §147-69.7, each will determine and consider as a collateral fac-
tor whether a manager qualifies as a historically underutilized busi-
ness as defined by N.C.G.S. §143-128.4."127 Such a "collateral factor"
could very well fall under the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Historical Development of Government Contract Affirmative
Action Jurisprudence
It was not always the case that any state-based racial classification is
automatically constitutionally suspect. The formal history of affirma-
tive action programs begins on September 24, 1965, when President
Lyndon Johnson issued Executive Order 11246, which required gov-
ernment actors to "take affirmative action" towards hiring minority
employees in government projects.128 Two years later, on October 17,
1967, Order 11246 was amended to include affirmative action on the
basis of gender.129
Since then, the practice of government-initiated affirmative action
programs for minorities has undergone considerable examination by
courts. In 1977, the Supreme Court ruled in Regents of California v.
Bakke130 that race-based affirmative action programs are subject to
strict scrutiny. The Court ultimately held that diversity is a compelling
state interest, but that the University of California's quota preferenc-
125. The evidence on this proposition is thin. However, statements at conferences by lobby-
ists such as this one could be seen as troubling if it appears that the funds acted on these exhorta-
tions: "But we draw a very clear distinction. We are not emerging managers, we are diverse and
minority managers, and again within that two percent of the CalPERS portfolio, some of our
biggest and best firms were not having success re-engaging with CalPERS." Transcript Part 2,
supra note 79, at 5.
126. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (holding that the firing of
nonminority teachers first is unconstitutional).
127. Emerging Managers Program, N.C. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TREASURER, 2, available at
https://www.nctreasurer.com/invlDocuments/EmergingManagerProgram.pdf.
128. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965).
129. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970).
130. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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ing racial minorities violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because setting quotas for minority admissions
was not the least restrictive means for correcting racial disparities.131
So began a saga of shifting jurisprudence on the topic of racial classifi-
cation for "benign" intentions.
In the decade and a half that followed Bakke, the Court twice up-
held government affirmative action programs, though both the cases
involved federal programs. A divided Burger Court upheld in Fulli-
love v. Klutznik that a public construction set-aside statute (the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977, which allowed over 10% of federal
grant money to be used for minority businesses) on the grounds that
Congress has "comprehensive remedial power" to carry out the guar-
antees of the Equal Protection Clause.132 However, the divided Court
without a majority opinion did not determine the level of scrutiny to
review these programs. In 1990, the Court in Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC133 chose to defer to the powers of Congress in enacting affirma-
tive action, declining to institute a strict-scrutiny standard for a federal
program that partly allowed existing broadcasting stations to be sold
exclusively to minority firms. The Court opted for an intermediate
scrutiny standard, again on the grounds that federal programs should
be treated differently from state and local programs.
Even before Metro Broadcasting was decided, the Court tightened
the framework for assessing government contracting affirmative ac-
tion programs to strict scrutiny.134 Importantly, the Court had been
applying strict scrutiny to state and local affirmative action programs
early on. In 1986, the Court held in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Edu-
cation 35 that though race-based affirmative action in public school
hiring decisions is sometimes permissible, the firing of non-minority
employees before minority employees of similar characteristics was
not permissible if based on history of private discrimination.
In 1989, the Court applied strict scrutiny to government contracting
affirmative action programs in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.136
It held that affirmative action is a "highly suspect tool" and cannot
stand when based on "amorphous claim[s]" of past discrimination.137
The Court in Croson struck down a city ordinance that set aside 30%
131. Id. at 289-90.
132. 448 U.S. 448, 483 (1980).
133. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
134. The Metro Broadcasting court had to distinguish the case from the Croson holding just a
year prior, by drawing a line between federal programs and state and local programs. Id. at 565.
135. 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
136. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
137. Id. at 493, 499.
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of its public contracts for MBEs on the grounds that the ordinance
cannot withstand review under the strict scrutiny analysis that must
apply to all race-based laws.138 Croson set forth the requirement that
the government actor would need to document evidence of discrimi-
nation that would justify the affirmative action.139 This cannot be gen-
eral pervasive discrimination. The rationale articulated by Justice
O'Connor in Croson is that the strict scrutiny standard will "'smoke
out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool. ' 140 In addition, the program would need to pass the narrow tai-
loring test as well.
Six years, later the Supreme Court extended the Croson holding to
federal programs, overturning its holding in Metro Broadcasting. In
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, the standard of strict scrutiny was
further underscored as applicable to well-intentioned race-based fed-
eral government action.141 Because the Adarand case was remanded,
Croson was the "last substantive decision on the requirements of strict
scrutiny in affirmative action programs in public contracting" by
SCOTUS. 14
2
In the aftermath of Croson and Adarand, the state of government
contract affirmative action programs implicating race appeared bleak.
Some programs were eliminated, as both legislatures and executives
responded to the Court's rulings. 143 The Department of Justice began
138. Id. at 506.
139. Id. at 480.
140. Id. at 493.
141. 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995). This came as a surprise to many in the legal community, be-
cause the language in Croson implied that the Fourteenth Amendment gave special powers to
the federal Congress to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. However, the Adarand Court
demanded "congruence" between state and federal approaches to affirmative action. Id. at 224.
The question of whether the federal standard should match the state standard was a source of
debate surrounding the Adarand decision. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The Making of a
Turning Point-Metro and Adarand, 84 CAL. L. REV. 875, 879 (1996). However, this course of
development is largely irrelevant to the issue at hand, because state pensions would have been
governed under the Croson strict scrutiny standard regardless of how the Court chose to regard
the issue of congruency between state and federal standards when considering the Adarand case.
142. Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, A Decade Later: Adarand and Croson and the Status of Minority
Preferences in Government Contracting, 21 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 7 (2009)
143. After Adarand, President Clinton issued a memorandum that sought to eliminate any
program that "(a) creates a quota; (b) creates preferences for unqualified individuals; (c) creates
reverse discrimination; or (d) continues even after its equal opportunity purposes have been
achieved." Memorandum from President William J. Clinton on Affirmative Action (July 19.
1995), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51632. Congress also "considered
terminating federal affirmative action programs" and ultimately made changes to statutes that
contained minority preferencing, like the SBA, ISTEA, and STURAA. Zehrt, supra note 142,
at 6. The amendments "impose[d] heavier documentary and other burdens upon states and local
governments participating in federal contracting programs." Id. at 6.
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attempting to amass existing evidence to help federal programs meet
the evidentiary hurdles. 144
Nevertheless, some programs remained and legal challenges en-
sued. Of the twenty-two government contracting cases brought under
the strict scrutiny standard to federal Courts of Appeal and state su-
preme courts after Croson, only seven fully survived strict scrutiny re-
view.145 Of the federal programs challenged after Adarand that
reached federal courts of appeal or state supreme courts, five of
eight 146 survived strict scrutiny review. Only two of the fourteen pro-
grams involving state/local programs challenged after Croson survived
strict scrutiny review in Courts of Appeal or state supreme courts (an-
other was partially upheld, for some racial categories but not for
others, and not for gender). 147 Thus, government contracting pro-
144. Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042-01
(May 23, 1996). A number of lower court cases found the materials in this report persuasive,
including the Tenth Circuit when considering the Adarand case on remand. Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand VIE), 228 F.3d 1147, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000).
145. See infra notes 147 and 148. There are some cases involving federal programs, decided
after Croson but before Adarand. Because the strict scrutiny standard was not clearly applicable
to the government programs in this era of cases, they are not included in this analysis. See, e.g.,
Winter Park Commc'ns, Inc. v. F.C.C., 873 F.2d 347, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1989), affid and remanded
sub nom. Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Slater, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981
F.2d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1992); Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 424 (7th Cir.
1991). There are of course also numerous federal district court and lower state court decisions
using the Croson/Adarand standard. For a partial listing by Professor George La Noue of the
University of Maryland Baltimore Cnty., see Disparity Studies as Evidence of Discrimination in
Federal Contracting: Briefing Report, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS 23, 26 n.4 (May 2006),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/DisparityStudies5-2006.pdf (collecting cases of times
when courts have criticized state and local disparity studies) [hereinafter USCCR Report].
146. The five that were upheld were: Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., San Diego Chap-
ter, Inc. v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2013); N. Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois,
473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007); W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. Dep't of Transp., 407 F.3d 983 (9th
Cir. 2005) (upholding the federal program but striking down the state program on an as-applied
challenge); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
The three struck down in the Federal Courts of Appeal were: Rothe Dev. Corp v. Dep't of
Def., 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Assoc. v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
In addition, consider Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C., 876 F.2d 902, 926 (D.C. Cir.
1989) rev'd sub nom. Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 515 U.S. 200. Shurberg was a post-Croson case where the D.C.
Circuit found the program unconstitutional by applying a strict scrutiny standard, but was re-
versed by the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting in 1990. However, because Adarand itself
overruled Metro Broadcasting, it appears that the program in Shurberg does not survive strict
scrutiny.
147. The fully upheld state/local programs were: Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty.
of Denver (Concrete Works IV), 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003) and Ritchey Produce Co. v. Ohio
Dep't of Adm. Serv., 85 Ohio St. 3d 194, 254, 1999-Ohio-262, 707 N.E.2d 871, 914 (1999). The
partially-upheld program was in H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2010). Also, in
150 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:107
grams that involve preferencing minority business - in the way that
some PPFs favor diverse managers - may face significant risk of inval-
idation if challenged in court.1 48
C. Strict Scrutiny Post-Croson and Adarand
In this section, I examine the standards for passing strict scrutiny set
forth in Croson and subsequent cases evaluating local and state pro-
grams. The strict scrutiny standard in Croson, reaffirmed by Adarand
for federal government programs, presents difficulties for PPFs from
two fronts. First, the Court set a very high bar for the quantity and
quality of documentary evidence required to establish compelling
state interest. 149 Second, the narrow-tailoring requirement essentially
requires that the government tries race-neutral approaches before
resorting to affirmative action programs at all. Understanding how
courts apply these standards is crucial to evaluating whether PPFs'
diverse manager programs are likely to survive a challenge.
1. Strict Scrutiny in Practice According to Croson
The Supreme Court has held that the proper standard for reviewing
government programs for race-based affirmative action (based on
Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1414
(9th Cir. 1991), a challenge to the program was found to not survive preliminary injunction on
the reasoning that the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits as the government pro-
duced enough evidence of compelling state interest and narrow tailoring. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's finding, and the case did not continue after the denial of prelimi-
nary injunction.
The unsuccessful state/local programs challenged in Federal Courts of Appeal were: W. States
Paving Co. v. Wash. Dep't of Transp., 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005) (including both a facial chal-
lenge to federal statute and an as-applied challenge to state program); Builders Ass'n of Greater
Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001); Associated Gen. Contrs. of Ohio, Inc. v.
Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000); W H Scott Constr. Co. v. City of Jackson, Miss., 199 F.3d
206 (5th Cir. 1999); Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997);
Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila.
(Contractors Ass'n I1), 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996); O'Donnell Const. Co. v. D.C., 963 F.2d 420,
427 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 1991). The
remaining three unsuccessful cases were state supreme court cases: Cleveland Constr., Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 864 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); L. Feriozzi Concrete Co. v. Casino
Reinvestment Dev. Auth., 776 A.2d 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); La. Ass'n Gen. Con-
tractors, Inc. v. State Div. of Admin., 669 So.2d 1185 (La. 1996).
148. Critics have pointed out that the "lack of constitutional certainty in this area has poten-
tially significant costs" for governments, lower courts, and businesses both nonminority and mi-
nority who must operate in the realm of uncertainty. Subash Iyer, Note: Resolving Constitutional
Uncertainty in Affirmative Action Through Constrained Constitutional Experimentation, 87
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1060, 1063-64 (2012).
149. Accordingly, some Congressional amendments to contracting statutes after Adarand also
"impose[d] heavier documentary and other burdens upon states and local governments partici-
pating in federal contracting programs." Zehrt, supra note 142, at 6.
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"benign" or "remedial" intentions) is strict scrutiny.150 The only time
the Court has applied this test substantively is in the Croson case, but
a number of lower courts have applied Croson to other cases.15' I first
review the Court's reasoning in Croson, and then turn to the few cases
in which Courts of Appeals have upheld government contracting af-
firmative action programs after Croson.
In Croson, the program set up by the City of Richmond was meant
to expand minority firm participation in city public contracting. Like
many emerging manager programs, the City of Richmond program
was not restricted to contractors in Richmond itself. The city set up a
program for Minority Business Enterprise subcontractors to receive at
least 30% of the dollar value of city-award contracts.152 The Croson
company, a non-minority business, was the only bidder on a project
but nevertheless did not win the bid because it did not have MBE
subcontractors. After it sued the city, the district court and Court of
Appeals both upheld the set-aside plan, but after the Supreme Court
remanded the case in light of the Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion decision, the Court of Appeals reversed course and struck down
the program on remand, partially by reading Wygant to mean that the
Constitution does not permit public action to remedy private discrimi-
nation. 153 The Supreme Court then affirmed the remanded decision
but specified that it is permissible in some cases to use public action to
remedy private discrimination. 154
The Court found that the City of Richmond's plan did not pass
strict scrutiny test first and foremost because it did not provide suffi-
cient evidentiary basis to show past discrimination in need of rem-
150. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493; Adarand II1, 515 U.S. at 205.
151. A number of other state court cases consider similar programs against the requirements
of their state constitutions. These cases are typically in states where the state constitutional bar
on race- and gender-based categorizations are even stricter than that of the federal Constitution.
See, e.g., Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Cal. 2000) (holding
that a MBE program violated the California constitution); La. Ass'n Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
State Div. of Admin., 669 So.2d 1185,1202 (La. 1996) (holding that a minority set-aside program
violated the Louisiana constitution).
152. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78. MBEs were defined as businesses at least 51% owned or
controlled by "minority group members," which included U.S. citizens who were "Blacks, Span-
ish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." Id.
153. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) ("[P]ublic employers are
trapped between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not taken
to remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability to nonminorities if affirmative ac-
tion is taken.").
154. Croson, 488 U.S. at 485-86, 490, 492 (plurality opinion). Dissenters Justices Marshall,
Brennan and Blackmun also found that remedying private discrimination is a compelling state
interest. Id. at 538.
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edy. 155 In the Court's view, this failed the first prong of compelling
state interest. In finding this, the Court rejected the District Court's
reliance on five "predicate 'facts'" to find past discrimination: first,
that the ordinance was explicitly remedial, second, that there was an-
ecdotal evidence of past discrimination, third, the disparity between
the percent of minorities in the general population versus in the con-
tracting world, fourth, that there were few minority contractors in the
state professional associations, and fifth, that Congress had previously
observed that the construction business is prone to excluding
minorities. 156
In the Supreme Court's view, these were insufficient for two rea-
sons. First, the disparity between the African-American population in
Richmond and the African-American population in contractors was
not deemed as sufficient evidence of past discrimination. In the
Court's view, "a generalized assertion that there has been past dis-
crimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative
body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to rem-
edy. ' 157 Second, because the problem discussed is so "ill-defined,"
the Court feared that the remedy would go on far too expansively and
for too long. 158 It appears that what Croson Court would demand is
an extremely specific type of analysis that demonstrates discrimina-
tion by showing that the capacity of minority businesses in the area
that is qualified to perform the job is higher than those who are actu-
ally hired to do it.' 59 In the Court's words, "where special qualifica-
tions are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of
demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minor-
ities qualified to undertake the particular task.' 160 The Court's rejec-
tion of the City of Richmond's evidence set a standard for later
decisions by lower courts, which tended to hold that government af-
firmative action programs generally failed to pass the test. They "sub-
stantiate[d] Justice Marshall's concern that the Court's decision places
an 'onerous documentary obligation[n]' upon government entities.1 61
The Court noted that in the absence of specific links to past discrim-
ination, it was "impossible to assess whether the Richmond Plan is
narrowly tailored" to remedy such discrimination. 162 However, it
155. Id. at 508.
156. Id. at 499.
157. Id. at 498.
158. Id. at 498, 505-06.
159. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-02.
160. Id. at 501-02.
161. Zehrt, supra note 142, at 9 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507).
162. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
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made two "observations" about narrow tailoring in this case before
concluding that it would not survive such a test:' 63 first, the considera-
tion of race-neutral alternatives, 164 and second, the numerical quota of
30 percent "cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except
perhaps outright racial balancing[,]' ' 165 which suggests that there
needs to be some sort of proportionality. In addition, elsewhere in the
opinion, the Court lamented the potential for "race-based decision-
making essentially limitless in scope and duration" as a problem for
the Richmond program.' 66 This suggests that timing and extent of the
program would also factor into a narrow tailoring analysis under
Croson.
2. Subsequent Lower Court Decisions
A number of lower courts following Croson have also reviewed
government contracting programs. Taken in sum, the Croson decision
and its progeny yield a complex, multitier analysis for courts to con-
sider when faced with a government sponsored affirmative action pro-
gram in contracting. Understanding these applications is crucial
because one important legacy of Croson is that the strict scrutiny stan-
dard in practice requires specific documentary evidence, and the eval-
uation of that evidence is done on a case-by-case basis. 167
a. Lower Court Application of Compelling State Interest
First, there must be a determination of whether there is discrimina-
tion by a specific entity, and this must be proven up with evidence
prior to the program's beginning. In the Court's words, the state's
effort to use affirmative action as a remedial measure need to do at
least two things to reach the level of compelling state interest: first,
there must be "some specificity" in the identification of discrimination
by the private or public entity instead of asserting societal discrimina-
tion.168 As the Sixth Circuit observed in Associated Gen. Contractors
of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik:169
Thus, the linchpin of the Croson analysis.., is not simply its man-
dating of strict scrutiny, the requirement that a program be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, but
163. Id. "We think it obvious that such a program is not narrowly tailored to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination." Id. at 508.
164. Id. at 507 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 181 (1987).
165. Id.
166. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
167. See Appendix C for a matrix listing applicable cases and their holdings.
168. Id. at 504.
169. 214 F.3d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 2000).
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above all its holding that governments must "identify discrimination
with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief;" ex-
plicit "findings of a constitutional or statutory violation must be
made.,"170
The specificity requirement is important because generalized decla-
rations of disparity - including declarations by the legislature - are
not enough.' 71 In addition, the analysis may turn on whether the dis-
crimination is by the government, or by private entities. Rectifying
the government's own discrimination is usually deemed as an appro-
priately compelling state interest. However, if there was private dis-
crimination, the court would then have to review whether the form of
private discrimination is of a sort that would allow government
remedy. 172
Second, the government must provide a "strong basis in evidence"
that there was discrimination "before it embarks on an affirmative ac-
tion program" to show that the remedy was necessary. 173 As a formal
matter, the government has a burden of producing strong evidence of
racial disparity. However, there is no need to definitively prove it up
at this point. In Concrete Works, the court clarified that, "To meet its
initial burden, Denver was not required to unequivocally establish the
existence of discrimination nor was it required to 'negate all evidence
of non-discrimination.""' 174 In evaluating the "initial burden," courts
have taken a varied approach as to the validity of forms, amounts, and
recency of evidence.
Successful challenges typically include a battery of statistical studies
as well as anecdotal evidence. 175 Most courts of appeal rely on the
170. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 497).
171. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (holding that legislative assertions are not enough). See Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923 (1995) (holding that no deference should be given to legislative decla-
rations that result in racial categorization).
172. The Supreme Court has not fleshed out what this would mean in practice.
173. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Educ., 476 U.S. at 277; see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10
(1996).
174. Concrete Works v. City & Cnty. of Denver (Concrete Works 1I), 36 F.3d 1513, 1530 (10th
Cir. 1994).
175. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., San Diego Chapter, Inc. v. California
Dep't of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2013) (presenting disparity study supple-
mented by anecdotal evidence); Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and Cnty. of Denver
(Concrete Works IV), 321 F.3d 950, 960-971 (10th Cir. 2003) (presenting a number of federal
reports and another slew of consultant-conducted statistical studies, including disparity studies,
as well as anecdotal evidence); N. Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 718-21 (7th Cir.
2007) (presenting consultant studies using a "custom census" instead of disparity studies, and
anecdotal evidence from public hearings); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345
F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003) (presenting consultant statistical studies, but not disparity study);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand VII), 228 F.3d 1147, 1166-69 (10th Cir. 2000)
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calculation of a "disparity index. ' 176 The general rule is that disparity
indices lower than 80% participation indicates discrimination may
have occurred.177 However, this is not at all a hard and fast rule.
Some courts deem a 22.5 disparity index a "close call" and punted on
the question entirely. 178 In addition, a number of courts also consider
whether the disparity index calculation is statistically significant. 179
There is also a debate over the numerator of the disparity index. In
other words, it is unclear whether to compare the level of utilization of
minority businesses with 1) the percentage of minority businesses in
the area, 2) the percentage of minority businesses that have the capac-
ity to fulfill the contract, or 3) the percentage of minority businesses
that are qualified, willing, and able to fulfill the contract.180 From
Croson, we know that a comparison between the level of minority
business utilization versus the population generally is not enough.,
Sometimes, the second option: of looking at capacity - is enough.18 2
However, courts are not consistent, and some may require the third
option.
In Rothe Dev. Corp v. Department of Defense,18 3 for example, the
Federal Circuit considered six disparity studies presented with low dis-
(presenting anecdotal evidence before Congress, disparity studies, and utilization studies show-
ing that when the program ended, minority participation dropped).
176. H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2010); Rothe Dev. Corp. v.
Dep't of Def., 545 F.3d 1023, 1037-38 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Concrete Works IV, 321 F.3d at 962-63;
W H Scott Constr. Co. v. City of Jackson, 199 F.3d 206, 218 (5th Cir. 1999); Eng'g Contractors
Ass'n v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d 895, 914 (11th Cir. 1997); Contractors Ass'n v. City of
Phila. (Contractors Ass'n I1), 6 F.3d 990, 1005 (3d Cir. 1993); Associated Gen. Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1991). Others have used
similar statistical indices. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Coalition for Economic Eq-
uity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1414 (9th Cir. 1991).
177. H.B. Rowe Co., 615 F.3d at 244; Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1041; Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at
914.
178. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila. (Contractors Ass'n I1), 91 F.3d 586, 605 (3d Cir.
1996).
179. H.B. Rowe Co, 615 F.3d at 244; Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 914.
180. Experts disagree on the quality of disparity studies. The U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights has prepared a report on the issue, with varying viewpoints from different scholars. See
generally USCCR Report, supra note 145.
181. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498. See also O'Donnell Const. Co. v. D.C., 963 F.2d 420, 426-27
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that disparity figures between city population and percent contracts
awarded is "constitutionally meaningless").
182. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and Cnty. of Denver (Concrete Works IV),
321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003) (presenting evidence in various forms, including utilization rates
that distilled away potential intervening factors, and another study that studied the actual versus
potential availability rate if minority firm formation rates were equal to whites/males). See also
N. Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on a "custom census" instead
of a disparity study); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cit.
2003) (relying on statistical studies that are not disparity studies).
183. 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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parity indices, but questioned the benchmark because two of the stud-
ies did not consider whether all the businesses available were actually
willing and able to fulfill the contract. There, the court did not state
whether the "qualified, willing and able" standard should be always
used, but found that the totality of questions such as this one made the
studies "substantially less probative" though not "wholly unrelia-
ble. 184 It ultimately held that there was no compelling state interest,
even when taken together with other statistical and anecdotal evi-
dence. 185 Similarly, in Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v.
Drabik,l8 6 the Sixth Circuit found a number of problems with the sta-
tistical studies, including the fact that they "make[ ] no attempt to
identify minority construction contracting firms that are ready, willing,
and able to perform state construction contracts of any particular
size. "187
Because the standards seem to be mercurial from year to year and
from court to court, there is a high level of uncertainty as to what it
takes to present enough evidence to demonstrate compelling govern-
ment interest.'88 Below, I list the myriad problems that courts have
found with evidence presented to show racial disparity in three of the
cases that were found unconstitutional. I match up similar rationales
in the same rows, so that each row show a distinct issue raised by the
courts.
W H Scott
Rothe18 9  Drabik'90  Construction'91
The six disparity studies Evidence cannot account
did not account for the for the question of what
size of the businesses, happens if firms split and
only accounted for suddenly there are more
contract size. firms in the numerator
without any substantive
exacerbation of problems
184. Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1044-45.
185. Id. at 1049. The Federal Circuit in Rothe appeared nervous to set a too-high standard. It
noted that its "holding is grounded in the particular items of evidence offered by DOD and
relied on by the district court ... should not be construed as stating blanket rules." Id.
186. 214 F.3d 730, 835 (6th Cir. 2000).
187. Id. at 736-37.
188. See Iyer, supra note 149, at 1063-64; USCCR Report, supra note 145, at 63-69.
189. Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1047-50.
190. Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 736-38 (6th Cir.
2000).
191. W H Constr. Co. v. City of Jackson, Miss., 199 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999).
2014] U.S. PUBLIC PENSION FUND DIVERSITY INITIATIVES 15,
Some of the disparity
studies did not include
the benchmark of firms
that were qualified,
willing, and able to
perform the contract
The state "makes no
attempt to identify
minority construction
contracting firms that are




The data's scope did not The population
match up and apply to considered did not match
the specific contracts up and apply to the
being considered in the kinds of contracts being
case. considered in the case
(contractors vs.
subcontractors)
It was unclear how much City did not adopt the
of the evidence was findings of the study
actually "before before the law was




nation) may not be
enough to show
nationwide discrimination
for a federal statute
Disparity studies can be
defective because they
"do not report the actual
use of minority firms;
they only report the use
of minority firms who
have gone to the trouble
of being certified and
listed among the state's
1,180 MBEs ._... ."_II
As this simple grid analysis shows, even states that presented disparity
studies were slammed with a litany of challenges (six separate chal-
lenges across three cases). Though each challenge is not necessarily
dispositive in any given case, this presents a glimpse into what defend-
ing government programs might expect. The U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights Report on affirmative action in government contracting
identified a number of "common flaws" in disparity studies:
They fail to measure availability according to requirements to com-
pare qualified, willing, and able businesses that perform similar ser-
vices. They use simple counts of businesses without taking capacity
into account. The researchers (1) use obsolete or incomplete data;
(2) report results in ways that exaggerate disparities; (3) fail to test
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for nondiscriminatory explanations for the differences; (4) find pur-
ported discrimination without identifying instances of bias or gen-
eral sources; (5) rely on anecdotal information that they have not
collected scientifically or verified; (6) do not examine disparities by
industry; and (7) neglect to identify which racial and ethnic groups
suffer from the disparities. 192
To build an evidentiary bulwark that can withstand such contestations
is arduous. The Commission recommended a number of measures for
government entities to take before creating race-conscious programs,
including: discarding data over five years old; adhering to "generally
accepted standards of social science;" properly benchmarking the
"available" pool; using multiple statistical measures of disparity; dif-
ferentiating between different categories of industries, minority
groups, and locales; accounting for capacity issues; performing careful
sorting of the numerator and denominator in calculating disparity in-
dices; among others. 193 While not all of these are necessarily required
for a government entity to prevail in court, the problem is that failure
on any of these fronts could lead to invalidation of the program.
Even if the state presents evidence that appears to establish statisti-
cal disparity, the struggle for evidentiary basis for compelling state in-
terest does not end there. After the state or locality has met its
burden of providing strong evidence of disparity, the challenging party
can introduce rebuttal evidence, at least in the several circuit courts
that have applied the Croson standard. The rebuttal evidence could
be fatal if it can provide particularized evidence "(1) showing that the
statistics are flawed; (2) demonstrating that the disparities shown by
the statistics are not significant or actionable; or (3) presenting con-
trasting statistical data. ' 194
b. Lower Court Applications of Narrow Tailoring Test
Should compelling state interest be established, then the inquiry
turns finally to the mode of intervention by the government. A num-
ber of state and local programs were invalidated on the grounds that
they were not narrowly tailored because they did not consider race-
neutral alternatives before turning to racial classification measures. 195
Some courts use the narrow tailoring question as a faster route to fail
192. USCCR Report, supra note 145, at 76.
193. Id. at 76-78.
194. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver (Concrete Works IV), 321 F.3d
950, 959 (10th Cir. 2003). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand VII), 228 F.3d
1147, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000); Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 921 (9th Cir.1991);
Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d 895, 916 (11th Cir.1997); Contractors
Ass'n v. City of Phila. (Contractors Ass'n 11), 6 F.3d 990, 1007 (3d Cir.1993).
195. See Zehrt, supra note 143, at 24 (collecting cases).
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the government program on strict scrutiny, and thus sometimes bypass
the compelling state interest prong entirely.196
The Supreme Court has made it clear that "narrow tailoring does
not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alterna-
tive."' 97 However it does "require serious, good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral alternatives." 198 As we know, Croson consid-
ered the consideration of race-neutral alternatives, proportionality of
numerical targets, and possibly duration of program. 199 But because
the Richmond program did not demonstrate prior discrimination, the
Court found it difficult to make a narrow tailoring assessment based
on remedial goals. In practice, lower courts have adopted an array of
factors to test the narrow tailoring requirement, inclusive of the
Croson court's considerations. As the Fourth Circuit explained in
H.B. Rowe, the factors to consider include:20 0
1) the necessity of the policy and the efficacy of alternative race
neutral policies; (2) the planned duration of the policy; (3) the rela-
tionship between the numerical goal and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population; (4) the flexibility of the
policy, including the provision of waivers if the goal cannot be met;
and (5) the burden of the policy on innocent third parties... [and] a
program's "overinclusiveness," . . . i.e., "its tendency to benefit par-
ticular minority groups that have not been shown to have suffered
invidious discrimination" 20 1
An examination of post-Croson cases shows that courts have applied
permutations of these factors. Many of these cases resulted in invali-
dations based on narrow tailoring. 20 2 However, some government
196. See, e.g., Virdi v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 135 F. App'x 262, 268 (11th Cir. 2005); MD/
DC/DE Broadcasters Assoc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 236 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila. (Contractors Ass'n 111), 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
197. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
198. Id. (citing City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (emphasizing
the City of Richmond's failure to consider race-neutral alternatives)).
199. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498, 507-08.
200. H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233, 252 (4th Cir. 2010).
201. Id. (internal citations omitted).
202. Virdi v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 135 F. App'x 262, 268 (11th Cir. 2005); W. States Paving
Co. v. Wash. Dep't of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no narrow tailoring on
the state level); MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Assoc. v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2001); Assoc. Gen.
Contactors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2000); Lutheran Church-Mo.
Synod v. F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Eng'g Contractors v. Metro. Dade Cnty, 122
F.3d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1997); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 714 (9th Cir. 1997);
Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila. (Contractors Ass'n Il1), 91 F.3d 586, 596 (3rd Cir. 1996);
O'Donnell Const. Co. v. D.C., 963 F.2d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty.,
941 F.2d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 1991); L. Feriozzi Concrete Co., Inc. v. Casino Reinv. Dev. Auth., 776
A.2d 254, 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Am. Subcontractors Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 376
S.E.2d 662, 666 (Ga. 1989).
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programs reviewed were designed - potentially with strict scrutiny in
mind - to pass the test and have done so successfully. For example,
though Croson noted that the narrow tailoring test would require gov-
ernments to use "race neutral means" where possible, and only if it is
unavailing, to resort to racial classification programs. 20 3 The Court
later stated in Grutter that a state need not "exhaust[ ] ... every con-
ceivable race-neutral alternative. ' 20 4 Thus, government affirmative
action programs that made good-faith efforts to "consider[ ] an in-
creasing number of race-neutral alternatives" have managed to suc-
ceed on that prong of strict scrutiny.20 5 On the other hand, programs
that did not consider race-neutral means were almost invariably struck
down.20 6
Another frequently-invoked question of narrow-tailoring, consid-
ered also by Croson, is whether there is any end in sight to the pro-
gram.207 Some federal programs have survived this test because they
require reauthorization. 20 8 Other programs lacking a sunset provision
have not. 20 9
The third challenge, about the match between the target goal of the
program versus the predicate findings in evidence, can be invoked in a
number of ways. Some courts have found that where the program
203. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506-07.
204. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
205. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187, 1199 (9th Cir.
2013) (suggesting, however, that it is possible that the state government need not adopt race-
neutral alternatives before pursuing racial categorization if the federal government has done so
already). See also H.B. Rowe, 615 F.3d at 252 (finding that the state had adopted "every con-
ceivable" race-neutral measure); N. Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 2007)
(noting that the government had maximized its goal through race-neutral means); Sherbrooke
Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding persuasive that the
Department of Transportation regulations place great emphasis on race-neutral alternatives);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand VII), 228 F.3d 1147, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000) (ac-
knowledging that Congress had considered a number of race-neutral measures over the years).
206. See Virdi, 135 F. App'x at 267; Drabik, 214 F.3d at 737; Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122
F.3d at 928-29; Contractors Ass'n II1, 91 F.3d 595-96; Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
876 F.2d 902, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1989) rev'd sub nom. Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 622
(1990) overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). Some efforts
to adopt race-neutral alternatives were nevertheless deemed not sufficient to pass narrow tailor-
ing. See Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the gov-
ernment did adopt some race neutral alts, like training sessions, info on access, etc., but program
was geographically inconsistent with disparity evidence).
207. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
208. See H.B. Rowe, 615 F.3d at 253 (noting that program requires new study every five
years); Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1180 (noting the reauthorization provision).
209. See, e.g., Virdi, 135 F. App'x at 268 (rejecting program based on lack of limitations on
time); Drabik, 214 F.3d at737-38 (noting lack of sunset provision, which had been considered but
rejected by legislature); O'Donnell Const. Co. v. D.C., 963 F.2d 420, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting
lack of timing restrictions on program).
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contracts with minority businesses of a different geographic area than
what was considered in the study, or did not consider geography at all,
the program fails narrow tailoring.210 Other focused on scenarios in
which there was not a direct relationship between the set-aside or tar-
get amount versus the degree of disparity for the specific minority
group.21' Thus, cases where the state can show a proportionality rela-
tionship between the numerical goal and the numerical disparity find-
ings could succeed.212
Fourth, courts favor programs that do not set quotas. 21 3 In fact,
they particularly prefer programs that allow contractors that do not
meet the racial criteria to waive into the allotments through good-
faith demonstrations. 214
The last consideration is a combined concern about over-and under-
inclusiveness. In this type of inquiry, courts are worried about minor-
ity groups who have not suffered past discrimination to be included in
the list of those who would be favored by the program,21 5 as well as by
situations where there is a group that is unfairly disadvantaged as a
result of the program. 216 A good example where both concerns coex-
ist in the same case is Associated General Construction of Ohio, Inc. v.
Drabik, where the court noted that the program
suffers from defects both of over and underinclusiveness. By lump-
ing together the groups of Blacks, Native Americans, Hispanics, and
Orientals (and leaving unclear the exact extent of the last two desig-
nations), the MBEA may well provide preference where there has
been no discrimination, and may not provide relief to groups where
discrimination might have been proven.217
210. See, e.g., O'Donnell, 963 F.2d at 427; Coral Const., 941 F.2d at 925.
211. Contractors Ass'n 111, 91 F.3d at 607 (noting that the set-aside amount was not related to
the disparity and the goal appeared "arbitrarily chosen").
212. See H.B. Rowe, 615 F.3d at 239 (finding particularly persuasive the fact that each com-
mittee linked the goal for a project to availability statistics for that project); Adarand VII, 228
F.3d at 1182.
213. See Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 2003)
(addressing lack of quotas favorably); Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1180 (considering flexibility
favorably).
214. See H.B. Rowe, 615 F.3d at 253 (noting favorably for the narrow tailoring analysis that
nonminorities could make good-faith waivers); W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. Dep't of Transp.,
407 F.3d 983, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding the federal program partly because it is flexible,
can have shifting goals, and can allow nonminorities with economic disadvantages to qualify).
215. See Builders Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting a "laundry list" of minority groups that did not necessarily match up with disparities in
contracting).
216. See Virdi v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 135 F. App'x 262, 267 (11th Cir. 2005) (striking
down a program involving a 15% set-aside for blacks but a 5% set-aside for other minorities).
217. Associated Gen. Contrs. of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 737 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Surviving narrow tailoring is difficult. As Lynne Ridgeway Zehrt
reflects, post-Croson decisions send the "inherent message . . . that
race-based affirmative action programs should only be considered as a
last resort and, when used, should be applied to as few minority
groups as possible. '218 As demonstrated above, there are certainly
ways to pass narrow tailoring, but because there are a number of con-
siderations, programs must address all of the features that may be
considered by the court to ensure that they can escape from this strap
of the "strict scrutiny straitjacket." 219
D. Gender-Based Classifications and Intermediate Scrutiny
Although most cases in the affirmative action arena have involved
race-based classifications, at least some parts of PPF diverse manager
programs pertain to gender and other nonracial classifications. The
Supreme Court has never directly reviewed a gender-based affirma-
tive action program. In Croson, Justice O'Connor explicitly stated
that strict scrutiny's benefits as a tool for reviewing legislative pur-
poses applies to both race and gender. 220 However, subsequent cases
on gender discrimination have suggested that the prevailing standard
is intermediate scrutiny. In a different context, the Supreme Court
has held that gender-based categorizations must establish "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" and "serve[ ] important governmental
objectives. '221 But since the Court has never opined on whether the
intermediate scrutiny standard applies to "benign" gender-based af-
firmative action programs, or only to invidious gender discrimina-
tion,222 it has thus not instructed whether an intermediate scrutiny
approach would look quite different from a strict scrutiny standard.
218. See Zehrt, supra note 143, at 25. The Court's narrow tailoring requirements - specifically
that of first attempting race-neutral means - has come under scrutiny by legal critics. Ian Ayres
argues that this method actually is not the most narrowly-tailored approach because
"[e]xtending affirmative action subsidies to non-victim whites produces less-tailored, overinclu-
sive programs." Ian Ayres, Symposium on Affirmative Action: Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1781, 1783 (1996). This is certainly true in the context of emerging managers, which prefer-
ences smaller and newer strategies that may include some minorities but also includes whites.
These programs might not otherwise be preferred if they did not include the racial composition.
But, by including nonminorities in its preferencing scheme, these programs throw into disarray
the scope of remedy. Ayres argues that quasi quotas - schemes where the percentage of minor-
ity participation would not be allowed to fall below a point where it would seriously negatively
affect the viability of minority businesses in general. Id. at 1785.
219. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 554 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 495. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286; Assoc. Gen. Contrac-
tors of Cal., Inc. v. S.F., 813 F.2d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 1987).
221. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).
222. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver (Concrete Works IV), 321
F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has developed a
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This results in a lack of criteria for determining whether a gender-
based affirmative action program serves a compelling state interest, or
to what extent such a program needs to be narrowly tailored. Thus,
lower courts must "work without an analogous evidentiary label from
the Supreme Court."223 Courts of Appeal reviewing gender-based af-
firmative action programs generally proclaim "something less than the
'strong basis in evidence' required to bear the weight of a race- or
ethnicity-conscious program. ' 224 The definition of "something less"
seems to definitely preclude "stereotypical generalizations" 225 and
"traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions. '226 Some of these courts
struck down gender-based measures when there was no specific evi-
dence of disadvantage, 227 but it is unclear what level of evidence
would be enough. Some lower courts have interpreted intermediate
scrutiny to mean that the government can use more generalized evi-
dence of societal discrimination, 228 or that the government itself needs
not to have been involved actively or passively in the discrimina-
tion.229 It is thus possible that a diverse manager program could fail
constitutional review on the race-based hiring portions, but not the
gender-based hiring portion of the program.
In the following Part, which focuses on race-based classifications
and whether PPFs would survive such review. I do not analyze
whether these programs' gender-based classifications would survive
intermediate scrutiny, for two reasons. First, as explained above, it is
unclear even to Courts of Appeal what exactly intermediate scrutiny
entails in the government contracting affirmative action world. Some
courts have cautioned that "the difference between the applicable
framework for analyzing equal protection challenges to gender-based remedial measures.");
Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d at 909 ("The Supreme Court has not
addressed the question explicitly, and there is a similar dearth of guidance in the reported deci-
sions of other federal appellate courts.").
223. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 909.
224. H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Eng'g Contractors,
122 F.3d at 909); see also Concrete Works IV, 321 F.3d at 959-60; Contractors Ass'n v. City of
Phila. (Contractors Ass'n I/), 6 F.3d at 1010; Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 931-32
(9th Cir. 1991).
225. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 910.
226. Concrete Works IV, 321 F.3d at 959 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 726 (1982)).
227. H.B. Rowe, 615 F.3d at 256; Mich. Rd. Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583, 595 (6th
Cir.1987).
228. Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1580 (11th Cir.1994).
229. Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Unlike the strict
standard of review applied to race-conscious programs, intermediate scrutiny does not require
any showing of governmental involvement, active or passive, in the discrimination it seeks to
remedy.").
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standards has become vanishingly small. ' 230 This suggests that Courts
may not find a functional difference in the standard for evaluating in
race- and gender-based remediation government contracting. 231
Second, even if there is to be a differentiated standard, speculating
on that standard is unlikely to be a good strategy for PPFs. Simply
guessing what intermediate scrutiny requires in terms of evidence and
programmatic tailoring is likely to yield faulty results. Facing an un-
certain terrain about the legal standard in other circuits and in the
Supreme Court, it may behoove governmental entities to be ready to
combat a strict-scrutiny review of gender-based affirmative action
programs. This is because there is no case law on what threshold of
utilization disparity applies to gender versus race. In one case, the
court rejected the gender-based classification even though it applied
intermediate scrutiny, because the evidence showed that there was no
utilization disparity on the downside for nonminority women. 232
However, that analysis does not set a threshold for how much of a
negative disparity is enough, and also ignores the fact that it is possible
that gender-based utilization disparities exist for minority women. In
any case, in two of the decisions where the state program survived
constitutional review, the court held that the gender-based classifica-
tion satisfied strict scrutiny and bypassed intermediate scrutiny analy-
sis altogether. 233
Given the uncertainty around the line between statistical robustness
that satisfies strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, it is safest for
governmental entities to err on the side of more evidence and nar-
rower tailoring even for gender-based classifications.
V. APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY TO PPF DIVERSE
MANAGER PROGRAMS
In this Section, I apply the strict scrutiny standard explicated in
Croson, Adarand, and subsequent lower cases to PPFs' diverse man-
230. Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2001).
231. This is the approach taken in Builders Ass'n. Id. at 644-45 (noting that "it is difficult to
see what sense [it] ... makes" to "provide stronger remedies for sex discrimination than for race
discrimination"). Because the government in Builders Ass'n did not argue for differentiated
standards, the court evaluated both programs with strict scrutiny. Id. at 644.
232. H.B. Rowe, 615 F.3d at 257.
233. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th
Cir. 2013) (finding that gender-based classifications are to be measured under intermediate scru-
tiny, though not defining the evidentiary standard, and holding that the program's gender classi-
fication survived strict scrutiny); Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver
(Concrete Works IV), 321 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2003) (deferring on whether intermediate
scrutiny question is appropriate instead finding that the gender classification met the strict scru-
tiny standard already).
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ager programs. I have already demonstrated that at least some di-
verse manager programs trigger strict scrutiny by taking race-
conscious state action. Next, I review the rationales that underlie the
PPF diversity manager programs, and conclude that only one - the
justice-based reason - could fit under the strict scrutiny doctrine. Fi-
nally, I argue that PPFs will have a difficult time surviving both the
compelling state interest and the narrow tailoring prongs of the strict
scrutiny test. As I make this argument, I will identify specific hurdles
that would have to be overcome in order for such programs to survive
constitutional review. 234
A. Potential Rationales for Compelling State Interest
in Selecting Diverse Managers
As we have discussed in Part IV, PPFs may have a number of ratio-
nales for enacting diversity manager programs, including 1) a belief
that diverse managers might bring some additional "plus factors" to
the table for investment purposes, 2) a belief that past under-
representation problems need to be corrected, and 3) a response to
political pressures to increase representation. The last factor is almost
certainly unlikely to build a positive case for compelling state interest.
This is because courts are unlikely to look at political pressures as in
itself a legitimate "legislative ... goal. '235 Thus, we explore in depth
the first two options as possible justifications for race-based action.
The first rationale - the idea that minority managers could be objec-
tively "better" at managing than other managers - is a concept that
courts have not opined on. However, this is unlikely to succeed in a
defense against strict scrutiny review, on two grounds. First, there is
simply not enough supporting empirical evidence to demonstrate that
women and racial minorities are better asset managers than their
white and male counterparts. As the analysis in Part IV demonstrates,
there are no studies to separate out race or gender as the factor that
drives performance, and especially not across all asset classes.
236
Though there are some indications that minority managers tend to be
newer and smaller, and that these newer and smaller asset managers
may perform better, even that tendency-based characterization is not
necessarily borne out by empirical evidence. 237
234. Though there have been no court challenges on Equal Protection Clause grounds to
these programs, the possibility is not foreclosed to future plaintiffs.
235. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
236. The diverse manager programs typically run across assets and strategies.
237. Emerging & Diverse Manager Data Report, supra note 76, at 19-24.
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Second and perhaps more fatally, the argument for better perform-
ance by minority managers would almost certainly fail the narrow tai-
loring test. In fact, advancing this rationale may drive courts to move
directly to narrow tailoring and find that there is no basis for race-
conscious action when a performance-based criterion will do. Be-
cause the argument rests on the ability of the subgroup of minority
managers to deliver objectively better performance than their non-
minority counterparts, PPFs will have a hard time demonstrating why
they would not use race- and gender-neutral criteria to find better per-
formers before resorting to race- and sex-based sorting criteria.
The "better managers" argument might take an alternate form if
there is temptation to try to analogize the contributions of minority
managers as similar to the diverse "contributions" of minority stu-
dents in the educational diversity cases. After all, a major criticism of
the asset management business is that many of the firm owners came
from the same social networks and business schools, which makes
them susceptible to the more pernicious effects of homogeneity.
Thus, the reasoning could be that collecting more diverse sources of
asset management talent constitutes a compelling state interest. In
other words, the advantage of these minority firms would not be that
they are better at managing money, but rather that their diversity
characteristics make them more attractive to a portfolio.
However, advancing this line of argument would involve fleshing
out what that diversity contribution means. In the education context,
the Court has focused on how educational diversity creates contribu-
tions to the learning process and points of view in the classroom; in
other words, there the Court has recognized - to a limited extent - an
institutional benefit of different voices. 238 Other options such as
"widespread societal discrimination" or "role models" have been re-
jected.239 The Court has also not paid much attention to the "service
to underserved communities" argument.2 40
The diversity of voices concept, however, does not translate easily
to the asset management business. First, the idea that diverse voices
can come together to learn from each other is not really plausible in
the investment management business. Managers do not ordinarily
238. Other potential benefits include preventing racial isolation and preparing individuals to
participate in diverse workplace settings. See, e.g., Meera E. Deo, Empirically-Derived Compel-
ling State Interests in Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 665 (arguing that
courts should consider avoiding racial isolation as a compelling state interest in addition to or in
lieu of educational diversity).
239. Id. at 668 n.40 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
240. Id. at 8 n.34 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 373 (1978)).
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meet face-to-face to discuss strategies with each other, especially be-
cause many try to keep their investment strategies secret. Even if they
did, it would be at industry conferences, not necessarily led by the
pension. In any case, such a diversity-of-substance idea is likely to be
rejected by courts. The Court had once suggested that diversity could
be a compelling state interest in the FCC's distribution of broadcast
licenses in Metro Broadcasting.2 41 However, Metro Broadcasting's
holding on this front has been called into question by Parents In-
volved,242 which suggested that perhaps the diversity interest ex-
pressed in Grutter only applies to higher education - and thus not to
primary schools, or to any other context such as broadcast licenses or
investment management. In addition, even Metro Broadcasting is in-
apposite to the instant scenario, because in the broadcasting business
it is at least possible to see how diversity of broadcaster can play into
the public's receipt of diverse viewpoints. This argument does not
work for investment managers, who do not share their strategies
broadly, and whose racial identities are unlikely to be substantially
relevant to their investment strategy.
Second, a more creative analogy could be that investment firms run
by minorities might be more likely to create uncorrelated, "diverse"
return streams, which would enhance the diversity of the portfolio and
lead to better returns. This theory runs into the same problems as the
"better performance" line of reasoning: first, it is empirically un-
proven, and second, even if it were true, it would fail narrow tailoring
because PPFs could capture these uncorrelated return streams by
targeting diversification in strategy, instead of using race or gender as
a proxy.
The other remaining rationale for PPFs' diversity initiatives is that
these pensions are fundamentally concerned about equality. As I
have explained in Part II.B, there are two logics by which this ratio-
nale can operate. One is a desire to reflect the diversity in the demo-
graphic of people the institution seeks to serve or support, in this case,
the pension population. However, the Court has never advanced this
matching-reflectiveness idea as a compelling government interest. Its
holding in cases like Fisher,2 43 Parents Involved,244 and Grutter245
strongly suggest that such a rationale would be summarily dismissed.
241. Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990).
242. Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 979-82 (2008).
243. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013).
244. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 727 (2007).
245. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
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The other potential impetus for PPFs to hire minority managers is a
desire to rectify past underrepresentation. This concept is far more
analogous to the issues at play in Croson and other efforts to include
more minority-owned businesses in government contracting in a re-
medial sense.
B. The Evidentiary Problem with Remedying Past Discrimination
as Compelling State Interest in the Investment
Management Industry
If PFFs use race-based categorizations to rectify past under-
representation, they face the same evidence issue as the Croson. The
City of Richmond characterized its program as "remedial," meant to
address the issue of low levels of participation by minorities in public
construction projects; PPFs would draw from a similar rationale with
respect to low participation by minority asset managers. PPFs are un-
likely to meet the evidentiary burden for compelling state interest
when it comes to historical discrimination against minority asset man-
agers. Like in Croson, though the fact that there are so few minority
businesses getting hired by the government, this is simply not enough
in the face of the law.
Our previous analysis has already revealed that race-conscious re-
medial government contracting programs are likely to fail, especially
those created by state governments. 246 There are only two examples
of a state program successfully establishing evidentiary basis for com-
pelling state interest under Croson.247 Only one was in federal court.
That case, Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of
Denver, involved setting numerical goals for women and minority con-
struction and design contracting. 248 There, in contrast to the City of
Richmond in Croson and likely in contrast to most other programs,
the City of Denver prepared vast amounts of evidence, including:
grievance reports alleging discrimination, federal agency reviews re-
porting discrimination, public hearing testimony to the same effect,
and four different studies documenting statistical disparity. In the
Tenth Circuit's opinion, this amounted to "extensive evidence [that]
support[ed] .. . [that the] ordinance[s] were necessary to remediate
246. Panelists before the U.S. Commission on Human Rights suggest that this is because the
quality of disparity studies on the state level is poor. See USCCR Report, supra note 145, at 17.
247. See Zehrt, supra note 143, at 19.
248. 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003).
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discrimination[.] ' '249 The other case, Ritchey Produce Co., Inc. v.
Ohio Dep't of Adm. Serv.,250 involved the General Assembly of Ohio
reviewing statistical data of disparity between qualified MBEs in the
state and the number of contracts awarded.
PPFs adopting diverse manager programs do not present a strong
basis in evidence to show statistical racial disparities in the public in-
stitutional asset management business before the programs were
adopted. Programs without statistical studies and other documentary
evidence have uniformly been rejected.251 But so did programs that
had varying amounts of disparity evidence that were rejected. As dis-
cussed in Part IV.C, there are number of steps that government enti-
ties would have to take to successfully defend its race-conscious
programs from challenge. 252
For example, the Federal Circuit was not satisfied with numerous
documentary evidence set forth by the Department of Defense in
Rothe,253 including six disparity studies that technically met the
Croson requirement of comparing "qualified" businesses available
versus those hired.254 In Drabnik, an Ohio program that set aside 5
percent of its contracting program to minorities was struck down by
the Sixth Circuit despite also having availability figures pursuant to
disparity studies and other evidence.255 Thus, the fight to show ade-
quate evidence is a tough one, and as PPF minority manager programs
stand today, they are unlikely to win if challenged. Of the potential
challenges outlined in Part IV.B.2, PPFs are unlikely to survive any,
even if it started anew (i.e., attempted to perform disparity studies and
249. Concrete Works IV, 321 F.3d at 990. In addition, the city attempted a volunteer program
encouraging participation in the past, which failed to gain traction, which likely contributed to
the Court's finding that the City's plan was narrowly tailored.
250. Ritchey Produce Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Adm. Serv., 85 Ohio St. 3d 194, 254, 1999-Ohio-
262, 707 N.E.2d 871, 914 (1999).
251. See, e.g., W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. Dep't of Transp., 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting that no disparity studies, anecdotal evidence, or consequential formal complaint records
were provided); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
state university provided no evidence of prior discrimination and that attempts to rely on legisla-
tive findings were unavailing). See also W H Scott Constr. Co. v. City of Jackson, Miss., 199 F.3d
206, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1999); Cleveland Constr. v. City of Cincinnati, 169 Ohio App. 3d 627, 641,
2006-Ohio-6452, 864 N.E.2d 116, 127. As the U.S. Commission on Human Rights report noted,
courts demand documented evidence of comparisons between firms that are "ready, willing, and
able" to do the job, but also will consider critiques of the capacity of "qualified" businesses. See
USCCR Report, supra note 145, at 4.
252. See USCCR Report, supra note 145, at 76 (listing many recommendations for state and
local governments to take before embarking on race-conscious contracting programs); supra
Part III.C.
253. Rothe Dev. Corp v. Dep't of Def., 545 F.3d 1023, 1042-43 (2008).
254. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501-02 (1989).
255. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 2000).
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other evidence-collection efforts before creating or renewing a
program).
First, even if one were able to create a benchmark of "qualified,
willing and able" minority managers generally, it would be difficult to
match up that data to the specific contract being elicited in each RFP,
which are specific to asset classes and market conditions. This is a
problem that is uniquely difficult for asset management, for two rea-
sons. One, both investment funds and RFPs are often siloed, so a
proper matching would have to be very granular (i.e., explore the
benchmark of available minority asset managers who manage interna-
tional equities). Second, unlike government contracts, qualifications
in the asset management business are a sliding scale. Whereas con-
tractors who have the capacity to perform a contract are deemed qual-
ified, there can always be "more" qualified asset managers who bring
in higher returns. However, even that parameter is constantly shift-
ing; there is no objective measure of what manager is actually most
qualified ex-ante.
Second, it would be very difficult to create a benchmark of minority
asset managers that are "qualified, willing, and able" 256 to perform the
contract of managing assets for any given fund, especially since the
way that allocations are divided are not consistent from time to time,
and strategies and capacities of investment funds shift frequently.
Third, asset managers are scattered nationwide; PPFs rarely per-
form RFP searches only within a geographic area.2 57 This triggers the
problem that courts are concerned about: that there is a geographic
mismatch between evidence and programming. 258
Fourth, there is no good way to get around some of the issues
presented by challenging plaintiffs, which courts have at least partially
considered. For example, there is just no way to account for numeri-
cal noise created by funds or firms splitting off259 (which would artifi-
cially create a greater denominator in the availability benchmark), or
for funds that do not choose to be listed among certified minority bus-
iness enterprises or whatever listings that end up being considered by
disparity studies.260
256. See Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1037-38; USCCR Report, supra note 145, at 4.
257. There are exceptions to this, such as the Philadelphia Pension Board's most recent di-
verse manager search. See Olsen, supra note 123.
258. See Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1049; O'Donnell Const. Co. v. D.C., 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 1991).
259. See Rothe, 545 F.3d at 1049; Drabik, 214 F.3d at 736-37.
260. Drabik, 214 F.3d at 737.
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If PPFs are to rely on generalized studies of overall disparities in
the asset management business, they would almost certainly fail.
Courts have rejected the general societal discrimination rationale as
insufficient for state and local governments to take on affirmative ac-
tion programs. 261 Indeed, even if the U.S. Congress were to recognize
the overall disparities studies, courts are still certain to require evi-
dence individualized for each state actor.262 One possible way for
PPFs to meet the evidentiary burden is by showing that the capacity of
minority asset managers was far larger than those hired by the funds.
However, even this is difficult because unlike qualifications in govern-
ment contracting, where a bidder is evaluated based on whether it is
able to complete the task, in investing, capacity is only one of many
factors that go into determining whether a particular asset manager is
qualified to invest money for the institution. These other factors
could include soft factors like client service, or run against minority
funds (track record, AUM).
Even if the PPFs supplied enough evidence that discrimination ex-
isted, there may be yet another level of analysis before they can prove
compelling state interest. If the PPFs' evidence show that the funds
themselves are the source of discrimination, then the inquiry for com-
pelling state interest would be shorter because the government's at-
tempt to eradicate its own discrimination is afforded more automatic
deference under the Croson analysis. 263 However, unless PPFs are
willing to admit that they did engage in discriminatory practices in the
past - a very unpalatable thing to say, for both political and public-
relations reasons, it is likely that the narrative advanced is that the
asset management industry - a private industry - has historically been
261. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989).
262. Croson's requirements that states implementing federal affirmative action statutes must
independently establish compelling state interest instead of relying on Congressional findings of
discrimination appear to have been undermined by some Courts of Appeal, which have deemed
constitutional the practices of some states to "rely upon [some] Congressional findings to estab-
lish evidence of a compelling interest." Zehrt, supra note 143, at 17 (citing N. Contracting, Inc.
v. Ill., 473 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2007); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 407 F.3d
964, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2003)). It is unclear if this interpretation will survive review in other Courts
of Appeal or by the Supreme Court, but in any case for present purposes, states that do have
diversity manager programs for their pension fund management are not relying on federal stat-
utes, nor on any sort of independent or Congressional findings of discrimination. Nor is it clear
that a nationwide study would benefit states, since the availability of emerging managers on a
national level may be much higher than in a given locale.
263. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92. However, as Ian Ayres and Frederick Vars point out, a
number of federal courts continued to apply the Wygant language that limited race-conscious
programs to remedy only discrimination by the "government unit involved" even years after the
Croson decision. See Ian Ayres & Frederick Vars, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1577, 1583 n.17 (1998)
(collecting cases).
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foreclosed to minority managers. Sufficient evidence of private dis-
crimination, however, does not automatically translate to government
remedy. Croson's suggestion that only when the government becomes
a "passive participant in a system of racial exclusion practiced by ele-
ments of the local ... industry. '264
The Supreme Court has not opined further on what this means, but
analysis by Ian Ayres and Frederick Vars suggests that it could consti-
tute one of three possible scenarios. 265 The first is that the govern-
ment's program would ensure that it would not cause private
discrimination (i.e. if contractors hired by the city discriminated in
taking on subcontractors), and the second is that the government
would use affirmative action to utilize minority business as much as it
would have "but for" the effects of private discrimination tamping
down on minority firms' ability to compete (i.e., if private associations
discriminated against minority practices and the associations were also
feeders to government contracts). This would be restricted to estimat-
ing the capacity of existing minority firms but-for discrimination, not
the total capacity of firms that would have existed but-for discrimina-
tion. Ayres and Vars argue that both the causal and but-for scenarios
are within the contemplation of Croson's stance that the government
can remedy private discrimination if it would otherwise be a "passive
participant" in that discriminatory scheme.266 Their final suggestion is
the "single-market justification" scenario, whereby "[t]he government
should be able to use affirmative action in procurement ... to correct
shortfalls in private purchasing caused by private discrimination. '267
Should the PPFs attempt to justify their programs along these three
dimensions, they would again need to root their analysis in ample evi-
dence. To prove the causal link, they would need to show that a pri-
vate actor - perhaps a consulting firm that channels investment
managers to public institutional funds - discriminates against minority
firms, and thus the government needs to enact a program to prevent
itself from being complicit in funding a discriminatory process. To
prove the but-for link, they would need to show that existing minority
asset managers could have been able to manage more public fund as-
sets but for the effects of private discrimination, and the PPF program
would accordingly remedy that differential. To prove the single-mar-
ket justification, they would have to show that private funds - such as
endowments, corporate pensions, etc. in the same "market" systemati-
264. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-92.
265. Ayres & Vars, supra note 263, at 1585-86.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1587.
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cally discriminate against minority managers, and the PPF's affirma-
tive action is to remedy that effect.
But these are just hypotheticals. It is not clear at all if the consult-
ing firms that facilitate manager searches have a history of discrimina-
tion.268 Even if there was some evidence of discrimination, the
pensions may not want to indict their business relationships with these
consulting firms. The single-market hypothetical is also merely specu-
lative at best: corporate pensions are themselves embracing diversity
initiatives, which directly counters the assertion that government
funds need to enact affirmative action programs to combat private dis-
crimination by private funds; if anything, the logic cuts the other way.
These analyses reveal a theme undergirding the challenges facing
PPFs facing the strict scrutiny gauntlet: it is difficult to articulate the
source of discrimination that gives rise to inequitable distributions in
both the number of minority firms in the market and the percentage
of institutional assets managed by minority firms. Without indicting a
fixed source of discrimination, it is difficult to see how courts could
find a compelling state interest based on substantive evidence of past
discrimination.
The argument often used by some PPFs in promoting their diversity
initiatives - that pensions programs utilize too few minority and
women-owned firms - would almost certainly fail under the Croson
standard. In Croson, the court explicitly rejected as unpersuasive the
statistical study that demonstrated that though half of the City of
Richmond's population - i.e. the presumptive "users" of public
projects - was African-American, less than 1% of its prime construc-
tion contracts went to minority businesses.269 In other words, making
the pool of government contractors reflect the pool of the population
is not likely to be a compelling state interest.
Another possible but likely unsuccessful justification would be that
PPFs' preference for diverse firms could be a catalyst to increase the
credibility and viability of diverse firms. As Pilar Avila, CEO of the
New America Alliance stated at a CaIPERS Emerging and Diverse
Manager event stated, the impact of CalPERS's program and ones
like it reverberates. "You know, the reality for, for small managers,
diverse managers is that a yes from CalPERS is a big yes. It's a big
seal of approval. '270 The idea of PPFs as leaders and incubators that
268. In fact, the idea for an emerging/diverse manager index was co-founded in the early
1990s by Ed Callan, the founder of a major pension asset management consulting firm, Callan
Associates. See Progress Investment Interactive Timeline, supra note 23.
269. Croson, 488 U.S. at 479-80.
270. Transcript Part 2, supra note 79, at 14.
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may lead to market change is a compelling one, but it once again
meets the same dead end as other rationales facing the strict scrutiny
test set forth in Croson. Courts are unlikely to find these statements
persuasive. However, they are likely to be concerned about the corol-
lary of large PPFs leading the charge in pushing to prominence certain
diverse firms: that the rejection of other firms may send an opposite
message. As Avila put it immediately after her previous statement,
"Likewise, a no from CalPERS it really could mean, or be interpreted
as many other things by the market." 271
C. Challenges in Narrowly Tailoring a Diverse Manager Program
At this point, it should be fairly obvious that notwithstanding the
compelling state interest problem, the PPFs also face a narrow tailor-
ing problem. The specific factor within narrow tailoring analysis that
appears to run across all the PPFs that have explicit diverse manager
programs is the issue of over- and under-inclusiveness. Because mi-
nority managers are generally defined very broadly, and because there
is not enough evidence establishing that various racial groups are simi-
larly burdened by historical discrimination in the asset management
business, it is unlikely that courts would consider these programs nar-
rowly tailored. This also affects the analysis of proportionality, be-
cause the lack of evidentiary basis in level of disparity for each group
means there cannot be a matching of the remedial goal to the level of
disparity.
That the programs are not necessarily long term set-asides (new
RFPs can always be issued and allocations can always be shifted), and
that at least some states require annual reports on the progress of the
program, seem to vitiate in favor of some of the narrow tailoring fac-
tors. In addition, some programs that also use race-neutral means of
accomplishing similar goals might be more likely to survive the nar-
row tailoring test. However, these programmatic features are still un-
likely to prevail given the lack of disparity evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
U.S. pension fund diversity initiatives as a whole can be impactful in
a number of arenas, including in the field of fiduciary duty as well as
the ability of certain institutions to bring about long-term market and
social change. However, the biggest legal issue facing PPF programs
in minority manager hiring is whether they could withstand Constitu-
tional review.
271. Id.
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In this paper, I have drawn the map of the broader context of PPFs'
diversity initiatives, which include other efforts that do not involve
race or gender-based classifications. These programs, such as publicly
supporting more corporate board diversity, collecting information
from asset managers about their diversity composition, supporting
third-party actors that create databases of emerging and diverse man-
agers, are not problematic on a constitutional level. Taken as a whole,
the package of diversity initiatives the PPFs pursue - with or without
the diverse manager component - implicate a number of important
issues for the industry.
First, some critics may question whether public pensions' commit-
ment to promoting diversity in any of the methods above is consistent
with their legal fiduciary duties to its beneficiaries. This critique fol-
lows a similar line of logic to the debates over whether corporations
and pension funds should engage in socially-responsible investing.
Criticisms of socially-responsible investing ("SRI") focus on the fail-
ure of the SRI strategies to pursue objectives other than financial in-
terest maximization.272 They argue that the pursuit of noneconomic
factors at the expense of financial interest maximization for the bene-
ficiary would be a breach of the pension's fiduciary duties. 273 Under
this line of argument, so, too would prioritizing noneconomic interests
in manager selection, which represents a drift from the pension's core
purpose. The cost of lost performance would have to be made up by
public taxpayers.
Indeed, it is possible to categorize the pursuit of diversity as a social
initiative along the same lines of promoting environmentally-responsi-
ble business practices. The crux of this inquiry is whether and how the
fund is bound to generate highest returns possible for its beneficiaries.
Even if profit maximization is the only goal, there is also room for
debate about how long of a time horizon that goal is to take place. In
other words, the question is whether promoting long-term gains in
more talent entering the asset-management business can be thought of
as a legitimate aim of a fiduciary.
A second is the signaling values of such a program and how it could
lead to structural changes in the asset management market. This issue
is one that funds like CalPERS and CaISTRS appear to take seriously.
Even without minority manager programs, PPFs can make great
strides in creating a signaling effect for the market. As Ed Dandridge,
the head of the NAIC, noted, "CalPERS by virtue of its historic lead-
272. See John H. Langbein & Richard A Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79
MIcH. L. REV. 73 (1980).
273. Id. at 96.
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ership, by virtue of its size, by virtue of the demonstrated leadership
that the Board has used to great effect ton corporate governance, as
well as in [the investment] space, comes with it a great opportunity to
help advance the common interest. '274 In a way, even if the diversity
initiatives are in the short term benefit-neutral for the PPFs (i.e., if
diversity of actors has no effect on corporate governance or asset
manager returns), it may still be worth promoting. The actions of
these large pools of institutional money acting in the interest of diver-
sity may signal to market players, such as women and minority-owned
firms, or potentially "board-ready" minorities and women, that they
would be unlikely to face invidious discrimination if they were to seek
those positions. In addition, as we have seen in the SEC context, the
actions of PPFs may spur action by other actors, such as government
agencies themselves.
The potential signaling and market-changing effects of PPF actions
on diversity are interesting, and possibly very encouraging. However,
they will be stymied if the pension funds are unable to defend itself
against challenges to a subset of its diversity-programs: diverse hiring
practices. Thus, PPFs should be extremely careful in evaluating and
reevaluating programs to hire minority or women-owned investment
managers. Though these programs have yet to be challenged - possi-
bly because there are low incentives for any given asset manager to do
so - one suit could begin the unraveling of programs nationwide. The
straitjacket of strict scrutiny is indeed tight, and PPFs would have to
do a lot of maneuvering in evidence-gathering and program design to
escape the death knell of a legal test that is not quite "fatal" in fact,
but certainly brutal in its ability to incapacitate existing affirmative
action programs across the country.
274. Transcript Part 2, supra note 79, at 8.
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VII. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A-1: CHART OF EXAMPLE RFPS FOR DIVERSE
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APPENDIX B: STATE PENSIONS FUNDING STATUS
Actuarial Market Funded UnfundedAssets Liability Ratio Liability
Alabama $27,902,559 $82,669,822 34% $54,767,263
Alaska $10,108,098 $33,579,228 30% $23,471,130
Arizona $30,359,859 $79,925,775 38% $49,565,916
Arkansas $6,864,900 $18,711,205 37% $11,846,305
California $415,621,000 $995,095,267 42% $579,474,267
Colorado $12,538,675 $41,576,848 30% $29,038,173
Connecticut $23,479,800 $97,439,982 24% $73,960,182
Delaware $7,565,440 $15,680,810 48% $8,115,370
Florida $127,891,781 $280,543,392 46% $152,651,611
Georgia $67,688,311 $151,447,824 45% $83,759,513
Hawaii $12,242,500 $39,193,563 31% $26,951,063
Idaho $11,306,200 $24,516,498 46% $13,210,298
Illinois $63,372,566 $314,857,111 20% $251,484,545
Indiana $21,002,787 $60,375,598 35% $39,372,811
Iowa $23,530,094 $53,887,720 44% $30,357,626
Kansas $13,278,490 $46,167,691 29% $32,889,201
Kentucky $18,289,914 $72,317,917 25% $54,028,003
Louisiana $24.014.289 $86,835,337 28% $62,821,048
Maine $11,076,400 $24,761,724 45% $13,685,324
Maryland $34,089,464 $101,771,068 33% $67,681,604
Massachusetts $42,649,119 $130,540,526 33% $87,891,407
Michigan $10,212,000 $30,600,677 33% $20,388,677
Minnesota $27,345,756 $73,262,495 37% $45,916,739
Mississippi $19,992,797 $67,673,609 30% $47,680,812
Missouri $7,897,167 $21,176,705 37% $13,279,538
Montana $7,347,601 $21,914,863 34% $14,567,262
Nebraska $1,418,153 $3,023.170 47% $1,605,017
Nevada $27,399,000 $75,741,238 36% $48,342,238
New Hampshire $5,861,896 $19,751,867 30% $13,889,971
New Jersey $42,800,310 $147,143,964 29% $104,343,654
New Mexico $21,218,347 $63,717,053 33% $42,498,706
New York $147,809,000 $309,763,562 48% $161,954,562
North Carolina $58,125,011 $109,297,356 53% $51,172,345
North Dakota $3,375,500 $10,541,999 32% $7,166,499
Ohio $124,925,508 $367,278,792 34% $242,353,284
Oklahoma $20,466,046 $60,727,151 34% $40,261,105
Oregon $44,943,100 $120,068,763 37% $75,125,663
Pennsylvania $83,530,310 $239,398,931 35% $155,868,621
Rhode Island $6,167,492 $19,527,153 32% $13,359,661
South Carolina $29,349,683 $82,013,612 36% $52,663,929
South Dakota $7,828,000 $14,938,398 52% $7,110,398
Tennessee $36,680.783 $73,328,483 50% $36,647,700
Texas $142,598,556 $340,996,932 42% $198,398,376
Utah $20,386,602 $49,001,616 42% $28,615,014
Vermont $2,918,189 $7,943,333 37% $5,025,144
Virginia $54,473,000 $133,823,921 41% $79,350,921
Washington $59,564,000 $122,563,542 49% $62,999,542
West Virginia $9,397,333 $27,378,131 34% $17,980,798
Wisconsin $78,940,000 $138,707,039 57% $59,767,039
Wyoming $6,187,203 $15,289,057 40% $9,101,854
Total $2,114,030,589 $5,518,488,319 38% $3,404,457,730
State Budget Solutions 50 State Pension Table, STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS (Sept. 3,
2013), http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org (all figures except Per Capita in
thousands). Reprinted with permission.
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APPENDIX C: POST-CROSON CASE SUMMARY
LOWER COURT CASES POST-CROSON & ADARAND
,Caseitation Typeof Evidence' Compelling Narrow- Constitutional? StatelFed
State Tnilotisg program
jriters
Associated Gen. - disparity studies, Yes Yes YES Federal program
Contractors of Am., anecdotal w/state
San Diego Chapter, Inc. evidence implementation
v. California Dep't of
Transp., 713 F.3d 1187
(9th Cir. 2013)
Concrete Works of -Federal agency Yes Yes YES State
Colorado, Inc. v. City reports, disparity (district
and County of Denver, studies, anecdotal court did
321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. evidence not err)
2003)
Northern Contracting, - custom census, Yes (relying Yes (state YES Federal program
Inc. v. Illinois, 473 other market on federal insulated w/state
F.3d 715 (7th Cir. studies, anecdotal evidence of when implementation
2007); evidence, CSI) acting as
department's own instrument
statistics, "zero of federal
goal" experiment policy)
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. - statistical Yes (relying Yes YES Federal program
Minn. Dep't of Transp., studies, anecdotal on federal w/state
345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. evidence evidence of implementation
2003) CSI)
Adarand Constructors, - disparity studies, Yes Yes YES Federal
Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d historical
1147 (10th Cir. 2000) evidence
Rothe Dev. Corp v. - six disparity No Does not NO Federal (DOD






H.B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. - disparity/ Yes Yes YES (some State
Tippett, 615 F.3d 233 utilization studies, races, not
(4th Cir. 2010) anecdotal gender)
evidence
Virdi v. DeKalb Cnty. n/a Does not No NO State
Sch. Dist., 135 F. reach
App'x 262, 267 (11 th
Cir. 2005)
W. States Paving Co. v. - Congressional: - federal - Federal - NO Both Facial
Wash. Dep't of utilization study, standard Yes challenge to
Transp., 407 F.3d 983 financing meets CSI - State - not federal program
(9th Cir. 2005) utilization study, (deferential narrowly As-applied
historical to other tailored challenge to
evidence, circuits?) Washington
- State level: no - state can DOT
disparity studies, rely on
no anecdotal federal CSI
evidence, no hut not NT
consequential
formal complaints
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Case citation Type of Evidence Compelling Narrow Constitutional? State/Fed
State Tailoring progr
Interest . . ,ro.r. .
MD/DC/DE n/a Does not No NO Federal
Broadcasters Assoc. v. reach
Federal
Communications
Comm'n, 236 F.3d 13
(D.C. Cir. 2001)
Builders Ass'n of - "no specific No No NO State
Greater Chi. v. County evidence of pre-
of Cook, 256 F.3d 642 enactment
(7th Cir. 2001) discrimination",
some testimonial
evidence
Associated Gen. - some statistical No No NO State
Contrs. of Ohio, Inc. v. analysis of
Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 disparity
(6th Cir. 2000)
W H Scott Constr. Co. - disparity studies No Did not NO State
v. City of Jackson, reach
Miss., 199 F.3d 206
(5th Cir. 1999)
Lutheran Church-Mo. n/a No (CSI No NO Federal
Synod v. Fed. argument
Commc'n Comm'n, relied only
141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. on diversity)
1998)
Eng'g Contractors Disparity study, No No NO State
Ass'n of S. Fla. Inc. v. rebuttal, and
Metro. Dade County, regression




Monterey Mech. Co. v. No evidence of No No NO State
Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 anything other
(9th Cir. 1997) than "legislative
findings"
Contractors Ass'n of E. - disparity study Does not No NO State/local
Pa. v. City of Phila., 91 reach
F.3d 586 (3rd Cir. conclusion
1996)
O'Donnell Const. Co. - comparison of No No NO State (DC)
v. D.C., 963 F.2d 420, populations,
427 (D.C. Cir. 1992) anecdotal
evidence
Coral Const. Co. v. no statistical data Remanded No NO State
King Cnty., 941 F.2d but numerous
910, 917 (9th Cir. affidavits
1991)
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Case cition Type ofEvidence 1Compelling Narrow Constitutional? State/Fed
State Taloriing prograsm
Interest
Shurberg Broad. of no hard evidence No No NO (reversed, Fed
Hartford, Inc. v. F.C.C., of disparity then reversed
876 F.2d 902,926 again)
(D.C. Cir. 1989) rev'd
sub nom. Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S.
547, 110 S. Ct. 2997,
Ill L. Ed. 2d 445
(1990) overruled by
Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
132 L. Ed. 2d 158
(1995)
Associated Gen. - testimonial Sufficient Sufficient Survives PJ State/local
Contractors of evidence, evidence to evidence to motion by P
California, Inc. v. Coal. statistical survive PJ survive PJ
for Econ. Equity, 950 evidence motion motion
F.2d 1401, 1414 (9th
Cir. 1991)
Cleveland Constr., Inc. - unclear at trial, No did not NO State
v. City of Cincinnati, but not much ("effectively reach
864 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio evidence conceded")
Ct. App. 2006)
Ritchey Produce Co., - statistical studies Yes Yes YES State
Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of
Adm. Serv., 1999-
Ohio-262, 85 Ohio St.
3d 194, 254, 707
N.E.2d 871, 914
L. Feriozzi Concrete n/a Parties No NO State
Co., Inc. v. Casino assumed yes
Reinvestment Dev.
Auth., 776 A.2d 254
(N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001)
Am. Subcontractors - old federal No No NO State
Ass'n, Georgia study, some
Chapter, Inc. v. City of statistical
Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 18, evidence,
376 S.E.2d 662 (1989) anecdotal
evidence from
public hearings
